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INTRODUCTION 
A. Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the 
place of essences in the epistemology 'of George Santayana. 
A subsidiary purpose will be to note, in addition to the 
place or function of essences in Santayana's epistemology, 
some of the strengths and weaknesses of his view. 
, B, Method 
The method to be employed will be to consider the 
function of essences within the framework of certain 
established epistemological problem~viz., the origin and 
nature of knowledge, the structure of the knowing situ-
ation, and the possibility of knowledge. After defining 
~~itical ~~alism and placing Santayana in the prop~r 
perspective within that movement (Chapter I) and determin-
ing the function of essences in terms ot the above 
mentioned problems (Chapters II, III, and IV1 the function 
of essences will be summarized and criticized (Chapter V) . 
C. The Scope of Research 
The works of Santayana that.have been used for 
this thesis date rather conspicuously from 1918. This is 
in deference to the author who says: 
-1-
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When by chance I open one of my books, especially 
the earlier ones, it seems to me the work of some 
other man; • . • the tone and tenor remain quite 
foreign to me. Not that I have changed my 
opinions . • . [but] it has taken the greater 
part of a long life for me to extricate my meaning 
from my words, find the center of my survey, and 
form fresh categories and a fresh vocabulary.l 
According to Butle~ Santayana considered his work prior 
to the publishing of Scepticism and Animal Faith in 1923 
. . t 2 as J.mma ure .. More specifically, one could hardly do 
research on Santayana without considering The Life of 
2 
Reason~ Bbwever, as recorded by Daniel Cory, his secretary, 
Santayana specified that one should evaluate the abridged 
and revised version of that work. For the above reasons, 
then, the scope of research has been limited to Santayana•s 
later and more 11mature 11 works. 
1George Santayana, The Idler And His Works And 
Other Essays, edited and prefaced by Daniel Cory (New 
~Y~o-r~k-:~-G~e--o~r~ge Braziller, Inc., 1957), p.7~ 
2Richard Butler, The Mind of Santayana (Chicago~ 
Henry Regnery Co., 1955), p. 58. 
3George Santayana, The Life of Reason, revised, 
abridged, and written in collaboration with his secretary 
Daniel Corey (New York: Charles Scribner•s Sons, 1954), 
p. v .. 
0 
CHAPTER I 
0 SANTAYANA; 'l'HE CRITICAL REALIST 
0 
In this chapter, Santayana's approach to critical 
~ealism will be examined. To do this the problem must be 
stated so as to reveal the reasons prompting the interpre-
tation given by the critical ~ealists. In addition to the 
re~sons behind this interpretation, the interpretation 
itself must be defined. Having defined and given reasons 
for this view, certain issues will emerge as problems to 
which Santayana must give a satisfactory solution. These 
problems and the adequacy of their solution will be the 
subject of the following chapters of this thesis. 
A. The Problem that Critical Realism 
Purports to Have Answered 
According to Santayana realism ranges in degree 
between the minimal assertion "that perception and thought 
refer to some object not the mere experience of perceiving 
and thinking, " and the maximal assertion "that perception 
and conception are always direct and literal revelations 
and that there is no such thing as error."1 Within this 
range of common assertion, there is the implicit assump-
tion that appearances, as perceived or thought~ are the 
source of knowledge. ~he differences in assertion, 
1George Santayana, "Three Proofs .~o;fi: Realism, 11 
Essays in Critical Realism; ed. Durant Drake (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1920), p. 163. All further references 
to this work will be designated as "Three Proofs .. " 
-4-
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however, are as to whether appearances merely ~ some 
external object or whether they are "direct and literal 
revelations" of such an object. Those realists who 
hold that appearances mean some object tend to hold that 
the characteristics present in consciousness may be used 
to interpret that object. On the other hand, those 
realists who hold that appearances are direct and literal 
revelations of some object, tend to identify the object 
and·the subjective experience in the act of knowing. The 
' 
problem then is to determine the nature of appearance and 
to discern whether it.~ay yield veridical transitive 
knowledge. Santayana states in the "Preface" of 
Scepticism and Animal Faith that ''the chief issue, is the 
relation of man and of his spirit to the universe."l In 
terms of epistemology this relation is apparently best 
explained for Santayana by a realistic dualism, but not 
an unqualified realistic dualism. 
According to Santayana these two tendenciesJ the 
minimal and maximal assertions of epistemological realism, 
are.complementary, and the alleged contradiction may be 
solved~ The one stresses the difference between substance 
and appearance and thus, the independence of the object, 
1George Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith 
(New York; Dover Publications, Incorporated, 1955), 
p, v~~~. All further re£erences to this work will be 
designated as Scepticism. 
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while the other stresses the similarity between perceived 
appearances and the nature of the object. The object is 
both distinct from the objective appearance in existence, 
and yet, relevant to it in essence, 1 Thus_, any realistic 
theory which emphasizes one tendency over the other is 
inadequate,.to the degree that it either stresses existen-
tial difference to the neglect of the similarity of 
essence; or the essential identity of essence to the 
neglect of the e~istential difference. ~rom this, 
Santayana concludes that knowledge must necessarily be a 
new fact. He says: 
Knowledge could not be knowledge at all unaess 
it was a fresh fact not identical in existence with 
its object; and it could not be true knowledge 
unless, in its deliverance, it specified some of 
the qualities or relations which really belong to 
that object.2 · 
The necessity of an animal body to give appearance a 
11 fo·cu.an or 11 locus, 11 and the concomitant necessity of the 
existence of an external object to make appearance 
significant, however, do not constitute evidence for the 
presence of physical reality in appearance. 3 Therefore, 
neither the identity or diversity of substance and 
6 
appearance yields an adequate analysis of knowledge per se. 
Any solution then must be a marriage of the truths 
of the independence of substance and the relevance of 
1Ibid.,pp. 165-166. 2Ibid.; p. 166. 3Ibid. , p, 165. 
• 
appearances to substance, To emphasize,either, to the 
exclusion of the other, would be to forget important 
I 
problems in experience. An over-emphas~s on the inde-
' 
pendence of substance would make know1e4ge impossible 
in any other sense than sheer dogmatic ~sse~tion. To 
make substance merely what is perceived would make the 
question of independent existence gratuitous. The 
inadequacy of knowledge is certain evidence of the 
I 
recalcitrance of substance to be reduced to the content 
of experience, and the meaningfulness o~ animal response 
to substance, manifested in flux, is sur:~ evidence for 
the relevance of appearance to substance!. 
Of course we may occasionally ber' deceived 
altogether: because the machinery o!f animal 
response is necessarily so intricate that it may 
get out of order, and a merely interhal stimulus, 
which ought to bring ±ntuition without belief, 
may start a practical reaction, and so produce 
illusion, or the belief that the merely imagined 
essence is the quality of an externa~ object. 
Yet' hallucination; madness; and dreams are soon 
cured or soon fatal; so that the normal corres-
pondence between perception and t~in~s re-
establishes itself automatically. : 
In the absence of an identity of idea an~ object; error 
is a persistent problem'; yet the relevan9e of our ideas 
to their objects tends 
brium. Santayana says 
I 
to maintain a meaningful 
j 
that 11complete knowledge 
equili,... 
, . .. is 
1George Santayana,_ 11Literal and Symbolic 
Knowledge, '' Journal of Philosophy, XV (August l, 1918), 
p. 434. All further references to this work will be 
designated as uLiteral. 11 
7 
~· 
incompatible with mortality and with the biological 
1 basis of thought,'' 
If then, knowledge is derived from appearance 
and appearance con~ains no physical realities, and yet 
it roughly corresp6nds to the movements of substance, 
what is the nature of the appearances and what is their 
relation to substance? According to Santayana substance 
and appearances are ;independent, but they were 11pre-
dest;ned for the future partnership; for its structure 
involved changes of structure which in due season would 
evolve the genesis of appearance .• It would seem 
then that appearance is dependent upon substance, yet 
only for its evolution. This would imply that any re-
presentational view would be inadequate, for substance 
and appearance are not the same thing, hut merely 11hang 
together and reflect one another ... Thus, appearance is 
1
'relevant 11 to the object, ',but not identical with it. 
Santayana says:. 
Mind has no capacity and no obligation to copy 
the world of matter nor to survey it impartially. 
At the same time mind affords a true expression of 
the world, rendered in vital perspectives and in 
human terms, since this mind arises and changes 
symptomatically at certain foci of animal life; foci 
which are a part of nature in dynamic correspondence 
with other parts diffused widely about them; so 
1Ibid., p, 435. Italics mine. 
2
santayana, 11Three Proofs, 11 p. 167. 
8 
•• that, for instance, alternative systems of reli-
gion and science, if not taken literally, may 
equally well express the actual operation·of 
things measured by1dif£erent organs or'from different centres. 
The relevance, then, of appearance to the world of matter 
allows mind to make a "true expression" while the inca-
pacity for literal knowledge or identity renders the 
possibility of alternative true expressions also. How 
then, on the basis of this discussion, may critical 
realism be defined and what, in particular, is Santayana's 
innovation? 
B, A Definition of Critical Realism 
In critical realism the primary elements of 
appearance, as existentially distinct yet relevant to 
substance, are taken as intermediary data or transitive 
signs for substance and its movements, Critical realism 
may be divided into two camps, essence-men and non-essence 
men, The non-essence men (Sellars, Lovejoy, Pratt) hold 
that this intermediary datum is a characteristic of the 
mental state and consequentially, actually existent,. 
whereas the essence men (Santayana, Strong, Drake, Rogers) 
hold that the intuition of essence is a psycho-physical 
product and therefore, essence, that which appears in 
intuition, is neither mental nor physical but 
1santayana, Scepticism, p. 98. 
9 
. 1 logical. According to Harlow: 
Critical Realistp contend that between the real 
object and the knowing subject o£ knowledge is a 
tertium quid,tP)wit, the datum, the logical charac-
ter (or quality group) of the external object which 
is the means by which perception occurs.2 
Although there is disagreement as to the nature of ·'the 
tertium quid among the critical realists, there doep not 
appear to be any disagreement on the fact tha~ knowledge 
is mediated, transitive, and that the data of experience 
serve a vehicular function. These intermediary appear-
ances bridge the basic subject object bipolarity and, as 
may be seen in the above <gno'ta_,ti'dn;:.¥ they ar.e.' -vehicular 
because they are the logical characters of external 
objects which are the means o£ perception, 
Before considering Santayana•s interpretation of 
these intermediary data and in order to focus his view 
more clearly, the dissenting interpretations of the non-
essence men must be seen, According to Sellars, the 
doctrine of the espence-men is not central to critical 
realism. Rather, the central doctrine is that all 
knowledge of past events and external objects are inter-
pretations and not literal presences of:those objects 
and events~ The emphasis is on the mediateness of 
1
victor E. Harlow, A Bibliography and Genetic 
Study of"American Realism (Not given; Harlow Publishing 
_Company, 1931), p, 72. 
2Ibid. 
10 
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1 knowledge. Among all of the critical realists, the 
mediateness of knowledge is basic,but the bone of conten-
tion is the nature of this mediating vehicle. 2 
Sellars says that the minor point as to whether 
these intermediary data are platonic universals or to be 
thought of in a conceptualistic sense is the only point on. 
which critical realists differ. 3 ~or Sellars a character 
is non-existential, but it is "a discrimination or a 
feature of a thought intrinsic to the total act of inter-
preting an object" or rather "a Gestalt in which we mean 
and interpret objects. ,.4 There is wide difference of 
opinion on what Sellars calls this "minor point." This 
might tend to suggest that the issu~ is of major irnpor-
tance. Santayana claims that these characters are non-
physical and non-mental, whereas Sellars holds that they 
are mental1 "they are features of the field of conscious-
ness."5 The non-essence men agree, then, that these 
characters are non-existential but.not necessarily non-
mental. 
Santayana's innovation is that the mediating 
vehicle is logical, neutral or aesthetic, the intuition of 
1R.oy Wood Sellars, "What is the Correct Interpre-
tation of Critical Realism?" Journal of Philosophy, XXIV 
(April 27, 1927), p. 238. 
2Ibid,, p. 239. 
5Ibid. 
4Ibid,, p .. 240. 
0 
0 
0 
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which is a product of the interaction of subject and object~ 
To hold to primary and secondary qualities is to assume that 
the data of experience should be either constituents of the 
object or exact reproductions of those constituents. For 
Santayana, the issue of primary and secondary qualities is 
f 1 t . 1 a a se ques ~on. As merely logical and non-existent, the 
data of sense and thought become e~sences. The identity of 
subject and object in the knowing situation is only postu-
lational and touches essences only having an 11 ideal status 11 
as the object of intuition or 11material status 11 as the fo:r:m 
of a thing. 2 Knowledge so considered is transitive and 
relevant: transitive in that ''self-existing things may 
become the chosen objects of a mind that identifies and 
.. 
indicates them; 11 and relevant in that 11 the thing indicated 
may have at least some of the qualities that the mind attri-
butes to it~ ••3 It follows then that knowledge requires the 
meaning of an object and the relevance of that meaning to 
the object meant. Therefore, perception and conception 
become for us an indication of a realm of objects, nature 
~ 
or aabstance. Santayana says: 
Thus the notion of an independent and permanent 
world is an ideal term used to mark and as it were 
1santayana, Scepticism, pp. 82-83. 
2santayana, 11Three Proofs," pp. 167~168. 
3Ibid., p. 168. 
0 
0 
0 
to justify the cohesion in space and the recurrence 
in time of recognizable groups of sensations.l 
SantayanaJs innovation, therefore, apserts the funda-
mental duality of an independent exist~nt, known on~y 
through postulation, based on an ideal ter.m which is 
both transitive and relevant, but neither a physical 
constituent of the object nor ·an exact representation 
of that object. How adequate, then, is the critical 
~~alist•s and, in particular, Santayana's solution of 
the problem of independent yet knowable existences? 
c. The New Problem of Critical Realism 
Butler says that the realistic tradition has 
failed to present an adequate realism; First the Neo-
Realists failed by establishing a fruitless monistic 
materialism, and then, the Critical Realists failed by 
exaggerating the dualistic dilemma. 2 It is too early to 
say whether or not Santayana•s innovation is a mere 
-
exaggeration. However, one thing may be said at this 
point and that is, that the introduction of non-existen-
tial but transitive and ~elevant essences does tend to 
complicate the knowing process. If the existential 
order can never be known as existence but 
1George Santayana, The Life of Reason, p. 25. 
2 Richard Butler, The Mind of Santayana, p. 46. 
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only as posited existence, mediated by non-existent 
logical terms, why should anyone believe there is such 
an order? For Santayana, the reasons why anyone should 
~elieve are unimportant in the £ace of the overwhelming 
universal and instinctive belief in an existential order, 
P~ople move out of the way o£ running horses, jump when 
. 
they are stung by a bee and pick flowers. ~or Santayana 
proof of existence is tautological because: 
· All reasonable human discourse makes realistic 
assumptions i so that these proofs, •. ~ • are 
necessarily ciraular; without assuming realism it 
would be impossible to prove realism or anything 
elsewl · 
Existence, however, is not the only question 
.here~ Wnat, then is the nature of existence? According 
to Santayana: 
What the object is in its intrinsic and complete 
constitution will never be known by man: but 
that this object exists.in a known space and time 
and has traceable physical relations with all 
other physical objects is given from the beginning: 
it is given in the fact that we can point to it.2 
14 
The nature of existence must remain somewhat of a mystery, 
if by nature is meant th~ "intrinsic and complete consti-
tution" o£ the object. lf, as has been noted, existence 
is an assumption or merely postulated in faith, then any 
natur~ attributed to existenc~ must be equally assumed. 
1 Santayana, "Three Proofs, 11 p, 183~ 
2Ibid., p. 172~ 
0 
0 
0 
ln so far, however, as existence does have "t:r.:aceable 
physical relations with all o·ther physical objects" in 
space and time, there is a sense in which its nature is 
revealed. That is, nature, in the sense of the most 
characteristic feature. For Santayana~ 
The great characteristic of what exists is to be 
in flux; . • . • It is a creature of circumstance.; 
compacted and surrounded by external relations.l 
This ''inner unrest" or "flux" of matter is the "se.at and 
organ of all manifestations."2 So considered, then, the 
nature of existence is to be in flux and, as such, to be 
responsible for all manifestations; while existence ." 
~tself is only postulational, and, due to the mediateness 
of knowledge, subject to error. Although non-existent 
terms are not parts of the material object, they may 
become relatively true descriptions of it, provided 
interest is maintained in the object by an instinctive 
b 1 . f . 't . t 3 e ~e ~n ~ s ex~s ence. 
The Critical Realists have~ there~ore, removed 
themselves from the main problem posed by a monistic 
epistemology, viz., the problem of error. According to 
Santayana: 
1lbid., pp. 180-181~ 
2 Santayana, The Idler And His Works And Other 
Essays, p, 116. 
3 Santayana, "Three Proofs," p, 165. 
15 
• 
Error . • . awakens ~ven the laziest philosophy 
from the dream of supposing that its own meander-
ings are nothing but strands in the texture of its 
object.! 
In avoiding the pitfalls of epistemological monism, how-
ever, the critical realists have inherited the traditional 
problems of any dualistic epistemology: (1) How do we 
come to know? That is, the origin and nature of knowledge 
(Chapter II) • (2) How can we be sure that we really know 
what we think we know? That is, the pos~ibility of 
knowledge (Chapter IV) • The latter problem is complicated 
further when it is asserted that the relevant data of the 
l6 
subject-object relationship is a consequent of their inter- · 
action but neither mental or material in character. The 
ultimate question, then, in determining the origin and 
nature of knowledge and in structuring the knowledge 
situation (Chapter III) is; is knowledge possible and if 
it is, how can we be sure that our knowledge is true? 
1santayana, Scepticism, p. 123 • 
CHAPTER II 
. ~HE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 
In this chapter the origin a~d nature of knowledge 
will be examined. To do this, essence will be traced from 
substance to the material psyche with spirit in it. After 
establishing the origins of knowledge, the nature of 
knowledge will be traced first by,distinguishing essence 
and existence, second by determining the function of 
essence, and third by considering the nature and function 
of the self. The conclusion of this chapter will take the 
form of a criticism arising out of the preceding analysis. 
A. 'The Scope 
For Santayana knowledge comes about as the dyna-
mic po·t:.ential of matter or flux becomes actual in spirit, 
or becomes in spirit 11knowledge of its own existence, 111 
In order to facilitate this process, matter must gener-
ate in the psyche 11organs fit for·actic:>n and observation. 112 
All power comes from the 11 inner un~est of matter" which 
establishes temporary equilibriums which become the focal 
points of interaction between the animal psyche and its 
environment. Psyche, too, is a product of material unrest 
1George Santayana, "Apologia Pro Mente Sua, 11 The 
Philosophy of Santayana, ed., Paul A. Schilpp (Chicago; 
The Library of Living Philosophers, 1940), II, p. 521. 
All further references to this work will be designated as 
11Apologia." 
2Ibid., p. 544. 
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and is formed as a habitual and instinctive "knot" in the 
activity of nature. Sense and reason are endowed by the 
psyche and consequently, are part of material activity. 1 
Spirit as passive reflective capacity becomes for matter 
"emotion and light" or as stated above "knowledge of its 
own existence."2 This is, in effect, an absolute 
materialism because all power to act and react is 
material~ whereas spirit may only arrest and fix various 
data as objects of interest. However, in fixing data of 
interest the spirit develops a "language of essence" 
which becomes a description of the activity of the psyche 
in response to the flux of matter. 3 pince response to · 
the natural environment is fixed according to the habits 
or "rhythms" of the psyche, this knowledge will not 
effect response unless the spiritual discovery is start-
ling enough to change the habit. Therefore, all activity 
a~d power is material although the discoveries of the 
spirit may effect a habitual change in the structure of 
the animal psyche. 4 
According to Santayana, then, the undisputed 
origin of all activity and consequent·knowledge is 
material unrest. Out of this unrest comes the environ£ 
ment of natural objects and the organs fit for action and 
1
rbid. ' p . 545 • 
3Ibid., p. 530. 
2Ibid., p. 570. 
4Ibid., pp. 541-542. 
observation which make knowledge of that unrest possible. 
The doctrine of ultimate m~terial agency then, becomes 
its own criterion. ln the development of the nature and 
origin of knowledge, Santayana must show that there is no 
area of conscious experience which cannot be explained in 
terms of material unrest and evolution, as represented,by 
intuited essences. rn the next two subtopics the pre-
20 
rational or·instinctive. life of animals will be dealt with. 
B. The Psyche 
Psyches are material, and they make adaptive 
responses to external stimulation.. They are "organiza-
tions in matter•' or 11 the spontaneous formation,. in living 
nuclei in matter, of organs fit for action and obser-
vation.111 Thus, within the unity of power inherent in 
matter, there arises a new material agency which is the 
beginning of knowledge. According to Santayana the very 
existence of knowledge about the activity of matter proves 
the existence of the animal psyche. He says: 
That there exists any perception or conception 
of a flux'proves that a knot or lump has been 
formed in that flux, a new self-repeating trops 
called life or the psyche, with spirit in it; se 
that a dualism arises within that monism, not a 
dualism of substance or dynamic process but a dual-
ism of quality and function.2 
1 . 
Ibid~ , p •. 5 44 . 2Ibid., p. 576. 
0 
0 
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So then, the emergence or evolvement of the organs of 
action and observation have become the sine qua ..!!2!1 of 
animal life and the consequent beginning of knowledge. 
Santayana says, 11There is no mental machinery; the under-
ground work is all done by the organism, in the psyche 
or ••• the unconscious mind. 111 The psyche operates 
instinctively or habitually. New knowledge, when 
st~rtling enough, ·may initiate a change or modification 
of.habit but, nevertheless, all responses of the psyche 
are habitual reactions to its natural environment. As 
will be seen later, the very habitual character of 
response allows for the recurrence of essence which 
makes true description possible. Remarking on the 
instinctive nature o£ the psyche Santayana says: 
It is only in very special directions, to very 
special occasional stimulations that he [the 
animal] develops instinctive responses in special 
organs: and his intuitions, • ~ . express these 
reactions.2 
Therefore, psyche is a spontaneously evolved set o£ 
adaptive organs which, although they do have a different 
quality and function than substance, do not attain 
immaterial status. 
Out of the chaos of material unrest a persisting 
pattern or 11 self-repeating trope'' becomes a centre of 
instinctive response aimed at adaptation to the natural 
21 
2 Santayana, Scepticism, p.64. 
environment. ~e psyche is thoro~ghly mechanical, 
responding only when stimulated. santayana says: 
The psyche is blind in herself;· • • • she is 
a .Prior principle of choice and jj.l~men£: and 
action in the dark; so that when the~light shines 
in that darkness, she comprehends it and feels at 
once whether the ray falls on the object toward 
which she was groping, or on some irrelevant 
thing.l 
Santayana•s langu~ge seems to get in the ~ay here when he 
refers to the instinctive and habitual psyche as a prior 
principle of choice and judgment. This terminology may 
only be understood in the light of his account of the 
formation of habits. Habits are formed only in special 
directions to special occasional stimulations. Not all 
stimulations prefig~re in the formation of habit whereas 
all response is in terms of some habit~ This, then, is 
the sense in which the psyche is the prior principle of 
choice and judgment. 
c. The Spirit 
The psyche responds to the flux of matter and in 
that response, the spirit which is carried along with 
that movement, fixes some datum in intuition. This 
datum becomes an ideal unity or essence which has a mean-
ing that can neither be attributed to the organ of sense 
nor the material stimulus, It is through this ~ixing of 
1Ibid.' p .. 156. 
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• meaning to the content of some intuition that spirit 
1 describes the activity of the psyche. Essence derives 
meaning through its conjunction with the response of the 
psyche to its environment. lntuition is occasioned by 
23 
environmental stimulation while the nature o£ the psyche 1s 
response determines the form of the intuition. 2 The 
subtle relevance of the essence to its meant ebject is 
maintained by the determination of the form of the intui-
tion by the habitual responses of th~ psyche. According 
to Santayana:-
The choice and the interest of essences come 
from the bent [habit~ instinctive nature] of the 
animal that elicits the vision of them from his 
own soul and its adventures; and nothing but 
affinity with my animal life le~ds the essences l 
am able to discern their moral colour. . ~ .~ 
Since, then, intuitions are materially occasioned by the 
environment and determined by the bent of the psyche, 
they become relatively true appearances of matter. Truth 
can only be relative in the sense that alt~ough essences 
are evoked by matter they are "conventional and qualified 
by the nature of the animal psyches in which they are 
1George Santayana, "Transcendental Absolutism," 
Twentieth century Philosophy, ed. Dagobert Runes {New 
York: The Philosophical Library, 1947), p. 320. 
2santayana, Scepticsm, p. 88~ 
3 Ibid., p. 76. 
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evoked. "1 
The spi~it, then, allows to~ the fi~st stage of 
knowledge, the fixation of appearance, Normally, 
essences present to the spirit merely describe some 
actual state of affairs, but occasionally "spiritual in-
sights induce a new habit."2 The spirit is immaterial and 
non-existent (these terms are equivalent fo~ Santayana) 
and is merely a recorde~ of the life of the psyche. 
Santayana says; 
The actor is the psyche in which the spirit lives; 
and it is this animal psyche that acts even in the 
spirit. The spirit merely perceives and endures 
that action, become for it emotion and light.3 
The self, th~n, which is to be discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter IV, has two aspects, the responsive material 
psyche and the immaterial, contemplative, and discoursing 
. 't 4 sp~rJ. , Psyche acts in accordance with proven habitual 
' 
responses, but is always ready to change those habitual 
responses for new ones, based on some new spiritual 
insight. The instigation of new habit on the basis of 
spiritual insight is the only escape from the circularity 
of the same old stimulus and response pattern. This has 
• 
been a discussion of the pre-rational or instinctive life 
of animals whereas npw the main concern will be the 
1santayana, 11Apologia, 11 p.· 508. 
2
santayana, ,Scepticism, cf., pp. 147-149. 
3Ibid,, p. 569. 4Ibid.,pp. 569-570. 
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rational life of animals~ In the rational stage of devel-
opment experience becomes·a teacher bringing progress in 
1 the arts, By the arts, Santay~na merely means the pursuit 
of knowledge via the use of symbols. 2 
P. Essence and Existence 
According to Santayana, "all appearances and meas-
ures are, as in the theory of relativity, relative to the 
observer." 3 Since every animal•s intuitions are occasioned 
by his own, environment and determined by hi·s own habitual 
structure·or bent, his perspective must,be relative. On 
this point Santayana admits he is dogmatic but says that 
this dogmatism is built on faith: 
A faith imposed ~ • • by the exigences of action 
and justified in the natural interplay of each animal 
with his environment. Such faith accumulates suffi-
cient and trustworthy knowledge o£ 'things--in--
themselves• •• ~ but th~s is natural knowledge •••• 
It is knowledge inevitably limited to the range of 
natural and artificial instruments that convey it, 
1santayana, "Apologia, .. p. 564. 
2santayana defines arts as the "arts of expres-
sion" asserting that the art.s "would be impossible if they 
were not extensions of normal human perception. " Further, 
11 the human 11!-edium of knowledge can perform its pertinent 
report all the better when it frankly abandons the plans of 
its object and expresses in symbols what we need to know of 
it. 11 Knowledge, then, is symbolical. and the arts are the 
expression of those symbols. (Scepticism, pp. 102-103). 
3George Santayana, "On Metaphysical Projection," 
The Idler and His Works, edited and prefaced by Daniel 
Cory (New York: George Braziller, Incorporated, 1957), 
p. 129. ~ 
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and couched 
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in the language of special experi-
Santayana says that he is a dogmatist and yet that he built 
his system on a sceptical foundation. 2 He says further~ 
"my scepticism remains merely the confession that faith is 
faith, without any rebellion against the physical neces-
··sity of believing, '' 3 Knowledge is possible bu,t only 
natural knowledge~ that is~ knowledge limited by the instru~ 
ments of perceiving. Scepticism warns about the uncer-
tainty of knowledge against the necess~ty of believing. 
Santayana says, "only the demand for literal knowledge 
makes knowledge impossible. 114 Why must literal knowledge 
be an impossible quest? Literal knowledge is impossible 
because knowledge is mediated (symbolic) and mediating 
vehicle; essence~ does not possess any of the constituent 
elements of the object for which we take it to be a sign. 5 
Hence, error or nthe conflict o£ dogmas 11 is always a 
possibility and a stimulus to criticism. 6 
.Because of the "conflict of dogmas," knowledge 
must be empirically and transaenden~criticized; empiri-
cal criticism, 11to reduce conventional beliefs to the 
facts they rest on, " and transcendental critic ism, ''to 
~antayana, 11Apologia, 11 p. 512. 2 Ibid., p .. 515. 
3 4 Ibid., p. 516. Santayana, 11Applogia," p .. 518. 
5
santayana, Scepticism, cf,, pp. 101-102. 
6Ibid .. , p .. 8. 
0 
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drive empiricism home" showing that it cannot produce 
any knowledge of fact whatsoever. 1 If this be the case, 
then all k;nowledge must be doubted, but even "the act 
of doubting wouid • • • be ignomi~~ if the beliefs 
which life and intelligence forced upon me were always 
false. "2 Santayana says, 11Scepticism is an exerci·se, · not 
a life • • • a discipline to purify the mind . ~ ~ and 
render it 
. "" . more apt • to believe and act 
wisely. 113 What then are the indubitable data of experi-
ence? 
From the perspective of empirically and trans-
cendentally criticized experience, the only indubitable 
i.s an immediate psycho-phys~ical awareness of essence. 
Santayana says: 
I have absolute assurance of nothing save of 
the character of some given essence1 the rest is 
arbitrary belief or int~rpretation added by animal 
impulse~21: 
I 
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What is given is not existence but essence. Although this 
essence is believed to be relevant to existence, there is 
no connection other than the constant conjunction o£ 
I 
certain essences with certain environmental stimulations. 
Essence is not 11 invented or'instituted for a purpose; it 
1Ibid., pp. 3~4. 
4Ibid., p. 110. 
2Ibid., p. 9. 3Ibid., p. 69. 
0 
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is something positive, anything that might be found, 
every quality of being ... l The realm of essence is an 
28 
infinite realm of characters possessed by a9tual things 
as well as the possible characters that things might have 
if they existed. Such essences have the ontological 
status of Platonic ideas b~t are axiologically and teleo-
2 logically neutral. To be even more explicit, essences 
are 11 anything definite cap?tble of appearing or being' 
thought of. "3 Essences, then, are the myriad of possible 
I 
aspects that existence might wear, none of which has any 
priority over any other_ Santayana uses the term 
existence: 
To designate not data of intuition, but facts 
or events believed to occur in nature. The facts 
or even events will include, first, intuitions 
themselves, or instances of consciousness, like 
pains and pleasures and all remembered experiences 
and mental discourse; and second, physical things 
and events having a transcendent relation to the 
data of intuition which in belief, may be used as 
signs for them •••• 4 
Essence, aside from being a~ object of aesthetic appre~ 
ciation, is a sign for facts or events whether mental or 
physical, ~h~th~r past, present, or future. Essences 
mean their objects. 
1lbid.-, 78 .. 2 . 77. p, Ibid., p. 
3santayana, "Apologia, .. p. 527. 
4santayana, SceEticism, p. 47. 
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I Essences are evoked by environmental stimulations 
and determined by the underlying structure of the organism, 
~he psyche. Intuition as a materia~ function of the psyche 
is existent. Consequently, intuition is "a conjunction of 
natures in adventitious and variable relations" and, that 
which is given in existence, essence, can never be existent 
since it is immediate and unrelated to any other essence. 
For Santayana it is axiomatic that "nothing existent can 
appear, and nothing specious can exist. 111 On the issue of 
the correspondence, yet dif'ference, between existence and 
essence, Santayana says: 
Nothing can ever make existence and essence continu-
ous, • • • like parallels such orders of being can 
never flow into one another. But they may be con-
joined or superimposed; they ~ay be simultaneous 
dimensions of the same world. 
As it now stands then, there is a posited o~ assumed exis-
tential order of substance which cannot appear, because 
nothing existent can appear, and an order of specious 
datum which cannot exist because they do appear. The 
divorce of substance or existence and essence would 
seem to be complete, almost too complete, were it not for 
the fact that these two orders seem to be 11 simultaneous 
dimensions of the same world." As mentioned above, the 
1Ibid., p. 63. 
2 George Santayana, "Transcendental Absolutism," 
p. 315 • 
• 
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reason why essence is stmply relevant rather than being a 
direct reflection or representation of the material order, 
is that the intuition of essence is an indirect function 
of the psyche or underlying organism which is consequent to 
environmental stimulation. Seen thus, the intuition of 
essences are evolved from environmental stimulation but 
elicited according to the habitual and instinctive structure 
of the psyche. As the datum of intuition, essence, is not a 
direct representation of existence but comes in response to 
I 
a reaction of the psyche to an external stimulus interpre-
ted by an immaterial spirit; it cannot be considered 
I 
existent and as elicited, that is, not produced by conscious 
effort, it cannot be considered mental, therefore, it must 
be considered neutral. Belief in a thing means the 
existence· of that thing~ whereas essence is anything that 
we do not believe in. Essence is merely taken as a sign of 
some believed in object. 1 According to Santayana: 
In order to reach existences, intent must trans-
cent intuition, and take data for what they mean, 
not for what they are ..•. 2 
Essences, then, may mean objects that exist but are not in 
themselves proper objects of belief. No essence is ever a 
11 goal 11 or 11motive power 11 exqept temporarily and p'er 
'd 3 accJ. ens. 
1Ibid., p. 317. 
3Ibid., p. 79 • 
I 
2 Santayana, Scepticism, P~ 65. 
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E. The Nature and Function of Essence 
Essence is always and necessarily identical with 
itself and, as such, more truly is than any changing sub-
stance. Essences may be e~changed but in themselves do not 
change. 1 Essences are not ,only self-identical but also 
2 different from every other essence. Essences are eternal 
forms of things, whereas the substance of those things is 
change itself. 3 Finally, essences are distinguished from 
existence in that they are internally related, whereas 
'4L 
physical events are externally related.· The essence in 
intuition is "probably not simple" possessing "a foothold 
f" 
·fol! discrimination of different moments or parts within it. u 5 
• Thus essence may have internal relations with its "moments" 
or "parts" while it remains unrelated to other essences not 
included in it. ~n summary, then, substance is in flux and 
as externally related has a location in space and time, 
whereas essence is self-identical and distinct from every 
other essence and as internally related is eternal, having 
1 . t' 6 no ocus ~n spaqe or ~me. Essence and substance touch 
only in change, where essences, the eternal forms of things, 
are exchanged for other essences. As stated above, essence 
journal 
!George Santayana, "Some Meanings of the Word IS, 11 
of Philosophy, XI (July 3, 1924), pp. 366-367. 
2
.Ibid., p. 367. 
3naniel Cory, "Some Notes on the ;Deliberate ,Philoso-
phy of Santayana, 11 Journal of Philosophy, XLVII (March 2, 
1950)' p, 11~. 
4Ibid., p, 116. 5santayana, Scepticism, p. 116. 
6santayana, "Literal, .. p. 438. 
·and existence are not continuous but are 11conjoined or 
superimposed ... The change or tropes·of matter are deter-
mined by the essences of tne moment, which are~ the forms 
of that particular thing. Essences determine the form of 
existence by their very self-identity~ eternality, and 
internal relatedness and the change of sUbstance may only 
be accomplished by exchanging essences which are them-
selves incapable of change,· Santayana says; 
The essence • • • remains, in its logical 
identity, precisely the essence that it was during 
that manifestation and before it. Were it not the 
same throughout, it could not be picked up or 
dropped, recognized,, OJ:< contrasted with the forms 
that existence might wear earlier or later. The 
eternal self-identity ot every essence is therefore 
a condition for the possibility of change ~ • • the 
realm of essence is . • • intimately interwoven, by 
its very eternity, wit~ this perpetual mutation, 
Allowing matter a dynamic priority (matter and not 
essence being the seat and principle of genesis). 
1 
. . . 
Matter is flux or change and to hav.e knowledge of change 
the animal. must be able to take account of the various 
exchanges of essence necessitated by the dynamic priority 
i 
of matter. 
F. The Sel,f 
Essences are both simple and, in allowing for dis-
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crimination of moment·s within themselves, complex, .Ebwever, 
granting this internal complexity, essences may be 
1santayana; 11Apologi:a, 11 pp, 525-526, 
0 
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considered as units.l To assert that different essences 
are the same is the condition of dialectic but this 
requires a leap of faith~ The very force of dialectic 
depends on being able to identify te,rms in isolation with 
related terms~ and this being an act oi faith maKes analy~ 
tic judgements synthetic~ By believing in demonstration, 
which is what is done in making synthetic ju~gements, an 
' 
active intelligence is assumed. 2 According to Santayana: 
In judgement, •• ~ there is more than intuition; 
there is assumed discourse, involving ttme, trans-
cendent reference, and various adventituous surveys 
of identical objects.3 . 
For Santayana, the essences are given and indnb±table in 
themselves, but discourse requires the identification of 
terms in absence with terms in relations, transcendent 
references and adventitious surveys involving time~ 
Santayana says: 
Dialectic ~ • • involves a realm of essence, 
independent of it, over which it may range; and 
its own temporal and progressive existence~ ••• 
Thus dialectic ~ • • must presuppose time, change, 
and the persistance of meaning in progressive 
discourse.4 
But, "any motion seen will be but a fixed image of motion .. "5 
If change is material and a conjunction of natures in 
1santayana, Scepticism, P~ 116. 
2Ibid., pp, ll7-ll9~ 
4Ibid., pp. 120-122. 
3Ibid., p. 119. 
5Ibid.,_ p .. 124. 
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external relation; how can change be intuited? · .lt can-
not; the data of intuition can hav~ only internal 
relation~. How tlien is change experienced? Change is 
experienced by a discoursing ~elf which remembers past 
essences, compares them with present intuitions and on 
the basis of remembered constant conjunctions, predicts 
£uture events. As stated above, this capaQity for 
telescoping time and change to provide "persistence of 
meaningsn is a presupposition of dialectic·· ox- 11progres• 
sive discourse. 11 
For Santaya~a experience is not mere conscious~ 
ness, experience is "a fund of wisdom gathered by 
living."1 The terms of discourse are controlled by the 
psyche but occasionally experience or discourse is inter-
J:;"Upted by "sh,ocks 11 or unexpected essences~ To experi-
ence shock is to be aware that there was a time prior to 
shock, that ~ ·am now experiencing shock, and that I have 
since passed to another state in which I am synthetically 
aware of the 11 coming, natu:r:e and the subsidence of that 
shock. 11 This experience of 11presence of the absent and 
·2 persistence of the receding, .... is called memory." 
Experience punctuated by shocks imposes.a belief in a 
11co:ncrete self~r that surveys ideal objects and adds its 
own adventitious' order as it wills, a 11 thinking mind." 
1' Ibid., p. 138. 
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But SantayanaKs self, the aelf of discourse, must be 
thickened and substantialized into "a nature • .. • more 
biased than a discoursing mind: the self posited by~the 
sen::;e of shock is a living psyche."1 The thinking mind 
fits the "critical reconstruction of belief" a,nd y~t 
Santayana holds: 
Mental di::;course is not, and cannot be, a self 
nor a psyche. It is all surface; it neither pre-
cedes, nor survives, nor guides, nor posits its 
datar it merely notes and remembers them. Discourse 
is a most sup~rficial function of the self: , •• 2 
So, then, the habitual, instinctive, and positing psyche 
is the self and discourse is essentially memory. 
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~owledge require::: both; there must be an underlying 
organism·which reacts characteristically or habitually uo· 
illicit essence, and there must be discourse which· adds 
adventitious order to those essences in order t0 describe 
their objects. 
Gr A Problem Concerning the Origin 
and Nature of Knowledge 
According to Santayana all agency and power is in 
the inner unrest of matter~ ~n his analysis the psyche 
is the actor and spirit merely rides along with it as its 
"emotion and light." In other words, spirit, as 
immaterial, has no motiv~ power or agency and merely 
2Ibid., p. 149. 
I ' 
records the activity of the material psyche~ As such~ 
this view would seem to rule out all novelty for the 
.36 
responses of the psyche are habitual. However, 11 spiritual 
insights may induce a new habit 11 and may consequently; 
effect animal activity although it has no agency of its 
own. Of real importance, however, is not whether or not 
such a scheme could explain novelty but whether or not 
such a scheme really suits the facts. According to this 
view all activity is determined by the habitual response 
of the animal psyche to environmental cues. The pr~blem 
·is, can habitual response alone be an adequate answer to 
the apparent variety with which the human animal acts 
" 
upon his environment? Can such a view adequately deal 
with the obvious factor$ of individual preferences and 
purpose? This problem must be referred to another part 
of this thesis. However, it must be stated here that the 
denial of any agency to spirit seems to the author of 
this thesis a serious weakness in this viewpoint. 
0 
CHAl?T.ER Il.I 
0 THE STRUCTURE OF r;LIHE KNOWING SITUATION 
0 
In this chapter the structure of the knowing 
situation will be analyzed so as to show the nature and 
function of the individual elements and their respective 
inter-relations to one another~ After this the knowledge 
situation will be summarized. The conclusion of this 
chapter will consist of a consideration of some problems 
that arise in the course of the preceding analysis. 
A, The Scope 
In epistemology the structural proplem is 
primarily concerned with the perceptual situation. 
Further, the perceptual situation refers to the relation 
of the constituent members of the knowledge situation to 
each other. 1 The usual members of this situation are: 
(1) the subject, which for Santayana is the selfr (2) the 
object, which for-Santayana is nature believed inr and, 
(3) the content, which for Santayana is joint-product of 
nature and one of its evolvements, psyche~ Along with 
these:members must be included the modes of cognition 
which are: (1) memory; (2) imagination; an~, (3) belief~ 
The structuring of these elements usually comes to a head 
·in the form of two basic issues: (l) ~re content and 
1pagobert Runes (ed~ Dictionary of Philosophy 
(New York: Philosophical Library; 1942), p. 96. 
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object identical or distinct? and, (2) Poes the object 
exist independently or dependently in regard to the know-
ing subject?1 For Santayana, as will be shown, the object 
is independent of the knowing subject, but the knowing sub-
ject is not independent of the existing object. This 
formulation is important, for as was shown in Chapter I, 
perception and conception are not liter~l revelations of 
the object, and yet perception and conception do refer to 
some object~ In brief, the object is independ~nt of the 
knowing subject, hut the knowing subject is not independent 
of the object. That is, his perceptions and conceptions 
are relevant to the object although not literally. 
B .. ·The Object 
S~ntayana would certainly agree with Bowne when he 
says: 
Common-sense assumes a world of things in space 
and time, altogether apart from mind and conscious~ 
ness, and we know this world by perception~2 
For Santayana this is a presupposition upon which life is 
dependent, 2 In fact, ·nthe deepest presuppositions ~ ~ • 
are the most trustworthy, since they express the primary 
aqju,st~entsof the psyche to the world.._ 113 In trusting the 
1Ibid, 
2 . 
Borden Parker Bowne, Theory of Thought and 
Knowledge (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1897), p. 49. 
3 Santayana, 11Apologia, 11 p. 505, 
deepest presuppositions, philosophy Prlunges 11 in medias 
res . 11 Why the middle? Because the origin of things 
cannot be known. To begin in the middle is to begin at 
the beginning· of something. Th~se presuppositions or 
principles of discourse 11 can never be discovered . 
until they have long been taken for granted) and employed 
1 in the very investigation whi!=!h reveals them. 11 What 
then is the object of perception? 
Substance was their [the senses and languages]. 
common object from the beg-inning, faith in sub-
stance not being a con~equence of reasoning about 
appearances, but an implication of action, and a 
conviction native to hunger, fear; feeding and 
fighting; as an aid ~nd guide to which the organs 
of the outer sense are developeds ~nd rapidly paint 
their various symbols in the mind. 
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The assurance of substance; then, is implicit in discourse. 
~o deny substance~ therefore, is to deny the occasion for 
consciousness and consequently, discourse itself. Hence, 
subst~nce as the deepest of presuppositions; cannot be 
denied since its denial must be based on experience which 
is itself a product of material forces. 
Since substance is the most basic presupposition, 
reason cannot be its justification, for reason is merely a 
form of animal faith. or, to' put it another way, 11 the 
suasion of sanity is physical: if y9u ·cut your· animal 
1santay~na, Scepticism, PP~ 1-2. 
2Ibid., p. 198. 
• 
• 
1 traces~ you run mad." Santayana does not make a plea 
for substance~ he ~eveals it as the necessary condition 
of all action and discourse. As such, substance is not 
a theory appealing for philosophical acceptance but a 
reality for the materialist and non-material1ist alike. 
Denial of substance is a denial of life it~elf, which is 
merely a response to material agency. Santayana does not 
feel that theoretical justification is necessary here 
since substance is more basic than any possible criterion 
by which it might be judged. Somewhat of a parallel can 
41 
be found in Bowne's category of bei~g. Being~ as the most 
fundamental category, asserts the necessary existence of 
something prior to the possibility of any predication. 
As with Bowne, predication is impossible without the all 
pervasive category of being~ so also with Santayana, dis-
course would be impossible without substance. 
A traditional argument against substance or 
permanence has been that all existence is in flux. 
Santayana accepts this dictum but adds that flux implies 
permanence. Successive or contiguous change implies a 
medium in which external relations are assumed and 
exchanged. The intuition of essences as internally 
related exclude the possibility that change is a function 
of appearance and therefore, change must be a function of 
1:rbid., p. 383. 
• substance as being in flux. 1 Flux, then, as denied of 
internally related essences or appearance and affirmed 
of externally related substance, does not deny perman-
ence of substance but rather, removes permanence to the 
I 
status of the medium in which flux takes place. 
Substance, then, is a medium inwhich the constituent 
elements are constantly changing their relations 'to one 
another. Flux accordi~gly has become a problem for the 
possibility of knowledge and not an argument against the 
existence of substance, 
C. The Content 
42 
As was stated in Chapter I, the subject of 
knowledge or the content of experience is a tertium ~' 
a logical character which is the means of perception: 
This datum is an essence which, although it is distinct 
from the object, means or refers to that external reality. 
Although ~~ps~p~§ce and substance are distinct, in terms 
of existence and conditions there is a "great simi!harity" 
between the "immediate data or symbols of sense or thought 
and •.. its object."2 If this were not tp.e case, then 
either the independence of the object or the possibility 
of knowledge would have to be denied. Santayana is not 
about to do this. Hence, the knowledgeable must be a 
1cory, "So)ne Notes on the Deliberate Philosophy of 
Santayana," p. 118. 
2santayana, ••Three Proofs, 11 p. 165. 
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"fresh fact,- 11 not identical with its object, yet somehow 
relevant to it.1 It might be asked here whether what 
must be for Santayana necessarily is, in reality. Is the 
must a product of independence yet relevance or is the 
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appearance of essence really a £resh fact? In other words, 
does Santayana· make the existence of a ''new fact" necessary 
to maintain the independence of the object and yet the 
relevance of its appearance to that object or are the appear-
ances of essences really new facts in-experience. Consider-
ing that he has avowed the independenc~ of the object while 
concurrently affirming.the.relevance of essence to the 
object, it could be that essence is simply a rational deus 
~ machina~ This is·a problem that must be considered 
although not at the. present stage of this analysis. 
The content of experience then is a logical essence, 
existentially'different, but·relevant in intuition to its 
object--substance~ This datum is logical since it is not 
only not a part of nature or mind but not even of the 
nature of the object or the mind. However, without this 
ideal datum "every 13upposed instance would be either a bit 
of sentience without an object~ or an existing entity un-
related to any mind-."2 How then is this ideal character 
related or relevant to its object? Since all that is 
1Ibid. 
2santayana, Scepticism, p. 81. 
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known with certainty is the immedi~te,. 11the ;j..mmediate must 
be .v.ehicular 11 in identifying its object. Further, as 
nahimal endeavors" have previously selected their object 
by intent and 11pa_ssive sensibil±ty11 has reported their 
appearance to the ~nima:I: mind, 11What is given becomes • 
•1 
a sign • • . and· conventional description 11 of its object, 
As established above, howev~r, matter is in flux or ~n 
external relations, whereas 2.1E¥!·S:~noe:!.::: ;i..s internally 
related and consequently,. ·cannot be a sign for change. For 
essence fixes some quality which is internally related but 
bereft of external relations, which can only be a property 
of existence. As discussed in Chapter .II, it is only the 
spirit which endures the succession of essences, is inter-
rupted by "shocks and consequentlY; posits change. The 
immediate data, then, are only signs of stat~c states 
which repres~nt mere pauses in the flux of existence, it 
takes essences plus adventitiously imposed external 
relations to symbolize living matter. 
Existence necessarily precedes its idealization as 
essence, ~owever, in the order of knowledge, ideals, as 
. d . t 2 the immediate data of exper~ence, must prece e ex~s ence. 
Essences as ideal forms becomes the means of material 
2George Santayana, The Life of Reason, p. 427. 
0 
0 
\ 
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change, matter displaying its formlessness by 11 Shedding 
every form in succession ... However, essences need matter 
to "pass from • ideal possibility into selected and 
instant being. 111 Substance and appearance or existence 
and essence have an identity touching essence on*y; that 
is, when essence is the form of a thing and not just an 
object of intuition~ 2 It would seem, then, that when the 
particular essence is transformeq from ideal possibility 
into instant being and as such, is fixed by intuition, 
that substance and appearance identify if only for one 
instant. Matter, which is basic as 11the seat and organ of 
all manifestations, .. continually exchanges its essences as 
timeless ideals, whereas, intuition, as a function of the 
psyche, does not contemplate the purity and eternity of 
essence for they are identified with their intended 
objects. 3 Spi~it, however, may contemplate essence in its 
purity, refusing to give any preference to any particular 
essence by taking it as a sign. ~is spiritual contempla-
tion of essence, however, is epistemologically bankrupt; 
though, aesthetically, it may be a source o£ great joy.4 
1 . Ibid., p. 434. 
2santayana, "Three Proofs, .. p. 168. 
3
santayana, 11 0n Metaphysical Projection, 11 PP- 116-
117. 
4
santayana, Scepticism, PP~ 74-76. 
There is a way in which essences do become exist-
ent. As soon as appearance ceases to be actual and can 
be viewed exuernally or taken as a sign for an absent 
appearance, it becomes existent. 1 It is not, however, 
the essence but rather the intuition that occurs and may 
be used by an 11 adventurous_ belief. 11 
Thus existence and non-existence seem to be 
relevant to appearances in so far as they are 
problematical and posited from the outside, not 
in·so far as they are certain and given.2 
What appears is an ideal object and not an event. This 
ideal object may, however, be confused with the event of 
its appearance and this consequentia~ existence is attri-
buted to it by the exigencies of animal life. According 
to Santayana, essence, 11by being noticed and treated as a 
46 
signal puts on the garment of existence. II Essences, . . . 
then, take on the aura of existence when they are singled 
out by the animal life, but this existence is not part of 
the true being of 3 Essences are non-existent any essence. 
and, except in the instant of their actualization in flux, 
never touch existence, whereas intuition, having a time 
and locus does have existence. 
Essences are not abstract ideas since their 
intended objects are not given. 4 The given cannot be 
1Ibid., pp. 44-45. 2Ibid., p. 45. 
3Ibid., p. 38. 4 Santayana, 11Apologia, 11 p. 534. 
0 
0 
abstracted from what is only posited, therefore, essences 
cannot be abstract ideas; they are the direct data of 
47 
sense and thought. Essences are not abstractions, neither 
do they exist. Essences are logical~ but they are not 
neutral: "They are psychical in quality and status. •l1 
As logical, essence maintains a logical identity. It is 
this very 11 eternal self-identity" which makes recognition, 
comparison, and ultimately knowledge possible for the 
self. 2 
To sum up, substance, as environment, determines 
the occasion on which intuition is evoked; however, as 
determined by ''the inherited organization of the animal" 
essence has a psychical status. 3 As such, essence, the 
content of experience~ is truly vehicular. As evoked by 
the underlying animal organism, it cannot be a constit-qen.:b.: 
part of substance; yet, as its presence is a result of 
environmental stimulation, it may be taken as relevant to 
that environment. Essences are the means whereby 
substance "flows" and yet by their eternal self-identity 
they make recognition, comparison, and judgment possible. 
What then is the nature of the subject in the perceptual 
situation? Santayana says: 
2Ibid., pp. 525-526. 
3santayana, Scepticism, p. 88. 
That there exists any perception or conception 
of a flux proves that a knot or lump has been 
formed in that flux, a new self-repeating trope 
called life or the psyche, with spirit in it; so 
that a dualism arises within the monism, not·a 
dualism of substance • . • but a dualism of 
quality and function.l 
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Substance, then, changes by exchanging essences while some-
how, out of that flux, a persisting pattern (psyche with 
spirit in it) evolves and ultimately becomes an awareness 
of that flux which produced it. This is the subject of 
the perceptual situation. 
D. The Subject 
The essence as a vehicle is like a ping-pong ball; 
it.has no motive power of its own. Essences do not impose 
themselves on nature, rather nature chooses its essences 
(by virtue of its dynamic priority) and likewise essences 
do not impose themselves on mind unless material circum-
stances have occasioned that essence. 2 The experience of 
the subject, then, is a consequence of two antecedent 
conditions, organ and stimulus, and their interaction. 3 
Since the subjects response is habitual and non-deliberative 
11the body • is the true •·subject' in experience . ~ 
and • • • the natural environment of the body, . • • is 
1santayana, 11Apologia, .. p. 576., 
2 Santayana, 11Transcendental Absolutism, .. p. 318. 
3santayana, Scepticism, p. 23. 
the true lobject. 1 " 1 The subject" then, is essentially 
material but with a different quality and function than 
mere substance. As was noted above, this quality is 
., 
psychic while its function is to observe the flux of its 
physical counterpart--nature. Matter may respond but it 
cannot observe, and, it is for this reason that spirit 
is posited to account for the fact that the subject fixes 
some datum and lends it a moral colour. For Santayana 
moral colour simply means the particular meaning that 
essences take on as a result of man's adventitious inter-
pretation. Moral colour must be given to essences which, 
o£ themselves, have no particular meaning. This moral 
colour can neither.be attributed to the organ of 
sensation nor the stimulus. 2 Moral colour comes entirely 
from the bent of the animal in its adventures. 3 The 
subject, then, is a habitual psyche with spirit in it 
which responds in characteristic ways to its object-
environment. 
The subject to be aware of itself must be more 
than mere response, it must be "a principle of steady 
life," or better "a thinking mind."4 According to 
Santayana.: 
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1
rbid,, pp. 23-24. 2 Santayana, ''Apologia, " p .. 530 .. 
3santayana, Scepticism, p. 76. 4Ibid. , p • 14 7.,. 
c 
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I have absolute assurance of nothing save of 
the character of some given essence; the rest is 
arbitrary belief or interpretation added by my 
animal impulse.l 
To live, however, the self must break out of the certain 
contemplation of essence into the uncertain meanings of 
2 
essence as determined by "subterranean forces." From 
the assurance of the identity of various essences in 
various circumstances to the necessary presuppositions of 
time and time transcending thoug~n, the self reveals 
itself. The self that manifests itself "when intuition 
has been deployed into a successive survey of constant 
ideal objects, adding . . . an adventitious order to the 
themes it rehearses; ..• suspending orpicking . 
them Up at W-lll. n 3 I'J1l... t 0 t 0 h f ~ ~~~e ransJ. J.on, owever, rom a 
responding organism to a discoursing mind would hou have 
been possible without three cognitive modes; believing, 
memory, and imagination, 
~elief manifests itself when an essence is taken 
50 
as a sign and not merely aesthetically admired. Santayana 
says: 
Ideas become beliefs only when by precipitating 
tendencies to action they persuade me that they are 
signs of things; and these things are not those 
ideas simply hypostatised, • • • The belief is 
imposed on me surreptitiously by a latent mechanical 
1·Ibid~, p. 110. 
3Ibid., p.. 14 7. 
• 
• 
reaction of my body on the object producing the 
ideai it is by no meays impli~d in any qualities 
obvious in that idea. ~ 
Bare intuitions then, are.not believed in until the body, 
after the mind intuits an essence, makes a iatent 
mechanical reaction. The concomitance of bodily attitude 
and intuition o;E essence becomes, in perception, 11 a 
stretching forth of intent beyond intuitioni . ~ . an 
exercise of intelligence. 112 Belief, as latent mechanical 
reaction, is a function of the more substantial self, the 
underlying psyche, and 11precedes all deliberate use of 
intuitions as signs or descriptions of things. 113 It is 
clear to see, then; that although discourse or thinking 
is a function of the spirit which is immaterial, all 
agency or power remains in matter. Belief, as a product 
of a latent mechanical reaction, is th~ material bridge 
over which spirit must trod to reach its object. Since 
knowledge can only be of the absent, memory must be among 
the believed in. 
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Memory is essentially the presence of the absent. 4 
Memory is necessary to the claim of transitive and 
realistic knowledge since mere intuition of essences, 
which are non-existent, cannot be called knowledge. Even 
1Ibid. ' p. 16. 
4Ibid., p. 141. 
2 Ibid., p. 282. 3:Ebid., P~ 179. 
·;; 
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description of essences as necessarily adventitious is 
inadequate to knowledge, 1 Essences must be believed inJ 
that is, taken for signs of existence. Memory is an 
implicit presupposition of sign meaning which requires 
some £or:m of judgment. Somehow, what has passed out of 
present experience must be retained for comparison and 
judgment. The psyche interacts with the environment 
whereas spirit, which lives in it, "merely perceives and 
endures that action, [and] becomes for it emotion and 
light. 2 The spirit::.perceives, endures, and retains in 
memory the description of the psyche's envolvement with 
its environment. Santayana says: 
In nature each moment is gone when it is past; 
in memory, for spirit, it is only when past that 
it can be present, and is then essentially present 
forever.3 
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These remembered essences, then, are not retained in their 
entiret.y as forms but rather "as signs for existence of 
which they furnish but an imperfect description~"4 With-
out 11 irrational :€lxpectation11 and belief in memory, man 
I 
lacks that "sagacity 11 necessary to interaction with his 
. t 5 envJ.ronmen • Memory, then, as well as belief in 
. 
substa~ce is assumed in action. 
1Ibid.,; p. 154. 2 
3tbid., PP~ 574-575~ 
S;rbid •. , p.. 31 .• 
Santayana, 11Apologia, 11 p. 570. 
4santayana, Sceptieism, p. 155. 
Essences may be retained in memory and taken as 
signs of existences; however, unless, as internally 
related, they are given some order they can never become 
knowledge of externally related existence. 
Perception is thus originally true as a signal, 
but false as a description; and to reach a truer 
description of the object we must appeal to intel-
ligence and hypothesis, imagining and thinking 1 what the effective import of our data may be .•.• 
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Existence is externally related and essences are internally 
related and never the twain shall meet save by "sympathetic 
imagination .. 11 Signs will never attain the 11 citadel" if it 
is indeed attainable at all, except by the imaginative 
ordering of essences remembered and believed in. 2 
Essences must be given external relations by a self before 
they ean be descriptive of externally related existence. 
In that case our knowledge will be as complete 
and accurate as . • • it can possibly be; yet since 
this adequate knowledge will remain transitive in 
intent (seeing as it is not satisfied to observe the 
given essence passively, as disembodied essence, but 
instinctively affirms it to be the essenc.e of a 
thing confronting us, which our bodies are hastening 
to cope with) therefore, this affirmation remains a 
claim to the end, subject to the insecurity 
inseparable from animal faith. • • .3 
Essences, then, must be taken as meaning existence (believed 
in) retained by memory, and imaginatively reconstructed 
before they become knowledge, which is, the goal of 
1santayana, 11Literal, 11 p. 440. 
2santayana; Scepticism, p. 105. 
3santayana; 11Literal, 11 p. 443. 
• 
• 
• 
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perception. 
E. Summary of the Knowledge Situation 
Substance, which possesses dynamic priority, 
changes by exchanging its essences. In the course of 
material flux, the psyche, which is a 11 self repeating 
trope 11 evolving out of material flux, is stimulated and 
responds habitually or instinctively according to 
patterns of response arising from special stimulations, 
upon special occasions. The psyche or substantial self, 
as material, has the power to act and does so only to 
environmental cues. The psyche act~ for the spirit which 
is immaterial and, ipso facto, has no power to act. The 
ppirit, however, which merely rides along with the psyche, 
has the function of fixing the intuitions of essence 
which arise from the underlying organization of the 
organism and lend them and ideal identity and continuity 
through memory. Spirit, then, is the source of knowledge 
in that it records the activity o£ the psyche. Since the 
spirit has no agency, it cannot directly influence the 
aetivity of the habitual psyche and hence, seems to make 
knowledge worthfuess. However, although spirit may not 
directly influence psyche, occasionally its insights are 
so intense that they initiate a change o.f habit. Accord-
ing to santayana's naturalism all respons~ is habitual 
and environmentally stimulated, hence, the only way a 
response may change is that the habit which illicit$ that 
response be changed. 
~e spirit in enduring the psyche•s activity and 
fixing the identity of consequent intuitions of essences, 
creates the tools of comparison and judgment. Through 
the comparison of the absent with the present, made 
possible by a time transcending memory and an externally 
relating imagination, spirit:passes from sign meaning to 
discourse~ Discourse, as an art of expression, expresses 
itself in.symbols and gives the inescapable conclusion of 
a thinking self. As has already been noted, there are 
two levels of the self for Santayana. The most basic 
level of the self is the 11 substantial self" which alone 
interacts with the environment. The second level ofdthe 
self, the self of discourse, is carried along in the 
substantial self but is itself 11 all surface 11 or insub-
stantial or better yet immaterial. By two levels of the 
self, Santayana does not mean two distinct entities but 
rather two dist-inct operations; the one substantial and 
there£ore, active; the other insubstantial and therefore, 
;, 
passive. 1 The knowing situation, then, is essentially an 
interaction between a stimulating natural environment and 
a responding n self repeating trope" (knot in material 
1santayana, Scepticism; cf~ pp. 147•149. 
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flux) whose activity is recorded or described by an 
immaterial or passive spirit. All power is in matter, 
hence, only substance apd psyche act whereas spirit as 
~mmaterial cannot act. 
w. Some Problems ~hat Have Arisen in This Chapter 
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Certainly the most-unique feature of Santayana•s 
thought here is that thinking is gonteinpiative,::. He,:adfuits-::tnat 
the object of perception is a construction or true des-
cription adventitiously made and yet denies any agency or 
motive power to the spirit. He speaks of 11 dramatic 11 and 
"sympathetic imagination," o~ giving external re·~a,tiops 
to internally related essences and o~ progress in the 
arts, made possible through symbolic expression, and yet, 
.says that the discoursing self is all surface, It 
apparently is necessary to think of two kinds of activity, 
one which is capable of effecting its· environment and 
another which is capable of constructing grandiose schemes 
but incapable o~ effecting directly its environment. Such 
a distinction is importapt in Santayanats treatment of the 
perceptual situation though nowhere specifically alluded 
to. The question, is, then, how can these interdependent 
yet parallel operations effectively interact? 
I . Another problem, related to the first, arises out 
of Santayana•s epiphenomenalism,s9Spirit is sort of an 
• 
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e~crescence or function arising out of material flux 
(everything is accept essences)) yet~ not directly ef£ect-
ing matter which is its source. How did such a function 
arise and~ does it effect, even directly, the change of 
habit it makes after particularly intense insights? 
Unfortunately, santayana's answer here would not be 
particularly helpful; he would say, the function which 
we call spirit or self is a necessary presupposition, 
second in importance only to the deepest presupposition 
of all, substance, which is its p~rent. The question of 
how it came about is mooted by the overwhelming evidence 
of the actual operation of some such faculty. How spirit 
arises out of substance and how it in turn effects that 
substance, though indirectly, still remains a mystery and 
a serious problem in Santayana's epistemology. 
Certainly another problem, which will be treated 
in more detail later, is w~y does substance, which has 
dynamic priority, have to exchange platonic essences in 
order to change? And £urther, if essence touches existence 
as the very £or:ms of change, in what se~se can we deny 
that in perception we perceive at least the £orms that 
existence would wear? If there is a concomitance of 
external stimulation and intuition of essence, why must 
the construction of o~r object be arbitrary and wholly 
imaginative? To these could be added a much more 
fundamental que~tion, What is, why cannot the·content of 
experience be conceived of in conceptualistic terms, 
that is, a~ psychical reactions of the underlying senti-
ent organism constructed into concepts by the constant 
conjunction of sign and significate? 
These and many other possible questions might be 
raised; however, the true test of any epistemological 
theory is whether or not it can account for the possi-
bility of knowledge. In the next chapter it will be 
~een that the ~elevance of appearance to substance 
assures the possibil±ty of knowledge, while the necessary 
independence of ~ubstance qualifies the traditional 
realistic conception of what would constitute knowledge. 
5~ 
CHAPTER IV 
THE POSSIBILI~ OF KNOWLEDGE 
• 
• 
In this chapter the possibil~ty of knowledge in 
Santayana•s epistemology will be considered. To do this 
it will be necessary to make a distinction between 
intuition of essences as insufficient for knowledge of 
existence and belief in the meaning of essence, taken as 
a sign, which is sufficient for knowledge of existence. 
After this the verifiability and truth of knowladge will 
be analyzed, ending with a consideration of some problems 
posed by Santayana•s account. 
A. The Scope 
The whole epistemology of Santayana is aimed at 
the ultimate problem of the possibility of knowledge and 
what would constitute knowledge. Essences, as the only 
indubitable data, 11 are therefore indispensible terms in 
the perception of matters of fact, and render transitive 
knowledge possible. J•J. The reason why science gets dis-
couraged is because it has a false cortception of what 
would constitute knowledge: science feels that knowledge 
ought to be literal when, in fact, it can never be such; 
knowledge must be symbolical and as such its "mor.al 
function of not leaving us in the dark about the world we 
live in is perfectly fulfilled. 112 So ·then, knowledge,·or. 
1Butler, The Mind of Santayana, p, 174. 
2santayq.na, "Ititeral, 11 p .. 436. 
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rather what would constitute knowledge for Santayana, is 
at best symbolic or derived, The animal can only have. 
literal knowledge of what is actually present to it, and 
consequently, it has literal knowledge of essence but 
essences are non-existent and, therefore; do not consti-
tute real knowledge about existence. 
For Santayana the dualism of sign and object is 
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undeniable as well as the undeniable "direction of atten-
tion and intent" to an object from whose representation 
. f t' . d . d 1 ~n orma ~on ~s er~ve • As will be shown further on, 
it is "bodily attitude" which confirms the existence of 
the object believed in. Mere intuition of essence with-
out the corroborating evidence of bodily attitude and 
consequent belief in existence would make knowledge 
impof?sible. :rt would be usensuous idolatry" to attempt 
to make non-existent essences part of the existent nature 
of the object. :rt is, however, understandable that this 
could happen, for the object, in acting on the organs of 
perception, evokes essences, These essences then become 
true as signs but false as descriptions until by imagining 
2 
and thinking a truer description may be made, Knowledge, 
then, is necessarily sy.mbolic and because of a fundamental 
" dualism it cannot be literal. .Accordi~g to this view; 
1:rbid., p. 339, 2 J:bid. ' p _. 440. 
• 
• 
• 
the object of $ignification become$ knowledge when the 
event of intuition of essence is confirmed by bodily 
attitude and believed in. According to such a view, 
then, knowledge is belief, though, as will be shown 
later, not an unqualified belief. 
B. The Beginnings of Knowledge 
It is proper here to determine why man studies 
nature at all. Man does not study nature so that he may 
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know how to act for man reacts habitually or instinctively 
out of the inherited organization of the organism. 1 
Spirit merely lives in the psyche, it simply 11perceives 
and endures that action11 and becomes its "emotion and 
light. 112 Animal faith and action is the proper activity 
of the psyche, it needs no rational justification and is 
prior to that knowledge~ Santayana says; 
Animal faith • • • requires no $pecial philo-
sophical evidence of its validity. All experience, 
all knowledge, all art are applications of it, and 
reason has no competence to defend this faith, 
because it rests on it,3 
Certainly, th~n; knowledge to act cannot be the reason for 
the study of nature. What then is the reason? 
Man studies nature simply because his environment, 
by its impact, will shock or startle him into attention 
1santayana, Scepticism, pp. 75-76 . 
2santayana, "Apologia, 11 p .. 570. 3Ibid., p. 581. 
and new thought. Man is not startled by mere 11 isness 11 
but rather by some movement; therefore, man is inter-
ested in nature for what it does and not what it is. 1 
Because of the duality of the knowing situation, 
knowledge is derived. Environment evokes in the organs 
of perception the intuitions of essences which are the 
indubitable data of experience~ Hence, essences are 
indirect representations of the movements and objects 
of nature, and consequently, knowledge of them can only 
be vouched for by animal faith or presumption. For this 
reason Santayana can say that "complete scepticism is not 
inconsistent with animal faith~" 2 It is becau.se the 
object itself cannot be known and yet life must go on 
that scepticism is not inconsistent with faith~ 
Nature in startling man initiates the prodess of 
transitive knowledge, This knowledge is facilitated by 
two leaps: the one, xrom the organism to the intuition 
of essence; the other, the leap of faith; from the symbol 
sensed or thou.ght to the external object. 3 The only 
sense in which Santayana could call the intuition of 
essence a leap would be that in~uition somehow passes 
from the "state of the living organism 11 or the underlyin~ 
63 
1santayana, Scepticism, p, 104. 2Ibid., p. 105. 
3santayana, "Three Proofs, 11 p. 183, 
• organs of sensibility to the consciousness of essence 
in spirit, The reason why the second leap is designated 
as a leap of faith is implicit in the uncertain~y of the 
accuracy of correspondence between the symbol and its 
intended object. Unfortunately the necessity of faith 
is irremediable £or 11 fatality • links the spirit to a 
material organ so that, in order to reach other things, 
it is obliged to leap, " but if the spirit were not so 
linked to some organ "and expressive of its rhythms and 
relations," spirit could not exist. 1 Spirit by itself 
is "omnipresent and omnimodal" and nothing could be "out 
of its cognitive range," but the spirit is dependent upon 
the psyche to direct her attention through involvement 
with the environment. 2 Spirit describes the objects that 
11 instinct is materially predisposed to cope with, 11 but it 
needs the essences evoked by that involvement to exist 
and function, Nature, then, makes a gesture towards man 
but man must interpret that gesture in terms of faith; 
faith that the gesture has meaning and ultimately that 
there is a gesturer~ 
C~ Intuition Is Insuf£icient for Enowledge 
Knowledge can never take place in the comp_aris.on 
1santayana, Scepticism, pp. 165-166. 
2Ibid,,. p. 166. 
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of two data given at the same time. Simu~taneous data 
are merely aspects of a complex essence and as such have 
no signification. Unless one of the terms is known by 
intent, th~ other may not serve to qualify the first. 1 
Learning, therefore, may only come about through the 
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comparison of present intuitions with remembered essences. 
Although essences present to intuition are non~existent, 
remembered essences can and do become objects of knowledge 
because, as past events, they can become objects of 
intent. 2 Knowledge, then, cannot come from hare intui-
tion; it comes when animal necessities lead man to gi~e 
an adventitious order to his intuitions and especially 
when inan learns "to discipline the otherwise too hurried 
credulities of timorous minds.-" 3 Knowledge is not 
immediate hut m~diate or inqirect and comes only when, 
through anima~ faith, man gives an adventitious order to 
otherwise sterile essences. Existence is externally 
related, whereas essence is internally related and if 
essence is ever to mean existence) it must he given an 
adventitious order or external relations as signs or 
symbols for that existential order~ According to Santayana: 
1 Ibid., p. 167. 2!hid., p. 169. 
3sterling P. Lamprecht, 11Animal ;Faith and the Art 
of Intuition, .. The Philosophy of Santayana ed.;~ Paul A .. 
Schilpp (Vol. II~ Chicago: The Library of Living Philo-
sophers, 1940), pp. 126-127. 
The expe~ience of essence is direct; the 
expression of natural facts through that medium 
is indirect. • • • The human medium of knowledge 
can perform its pertinent synthesis and make its 
pertinent ~eport all the better when it frankly 
abandons the plane of its object and expresses 
in symbols what we need to know of it.l 
~owledge, then, if it is to be knowledge of externally 
related existence must itself be externally related. As 
the only indubitable data are essences_and they are 
simple or unrelated {if complex they are internally 
related) knowledge of existence or knowledge on the plane 
of its object must be abandoned. ~n giving an adventi-
tious order to essences and consequently abandoning the 
plane of the object and the immediate data of experience, 
knowledge necessarily becomes mediate~ If, then, 
knowledge is to be attained, essences must become signs 
or symbols for natu~e. 
To say that essences must become signs or symbols 
would be to overlook the fact that "sensibility naturally 
becomes objective, expectant, and full of assurance and 
transcendent intent."2 Since essences are provoked by 
environmental stimulatio~s, they are associated with the 
bodily attitude that is assumed as a result of that 
stimulation. In this way then sensibility becomes 
1santayana; Scepticism, p. 102. 
2santayana, "Apo'logia," p. 506. 
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knowledge of the materia]. world "but in its own sensual 
1 or conceptual term::; .• 11 Ha',bit, then, responds in 
characteristic ways to special stimulations, and there-
£ore, gives off data which may ',be relied upon as signs. 
Santayana says; 
I am by no means compelled to yield ignominously 
to any animal illusion; what guides me there is not 
illusion but habit; and the intuitions which 
accompany habit are natural signs for the circle of 2 objects and forces by which that habit is sustained. 
In. taking essences as signs illusion does not<guide. 
Habit assures the relevancy of signs to their intended 
objects., 
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Signs have intent and transcendent reference, they 
mean some external objects, past, or future events but 
they cannot reveal the Ding-~~· If the thing-in-
itseJ.f is ever to be revealed it will be through 11 sympa-
thetic imagination, II but even when 11 the given essence 
will be the essence of the object meant • knowledge 
will remain a claim. 11a Santayana asks what has happened 
to the "gross object" encountered in experience when we 
analyze it, nothing remains but a few abstract, .logical 
elements. His answer is~ 
Our powers of perception and conception are soon 
outrun; the threads become invisible which, when 
' 2 Santayana, Scepticism, p, 105 • 
3Ibid,., p. 107. 
woven together; made the cloth we saw~ • • ~ 
Matter must include a thousand concrete 
accompanfments, which in such description are 
ignored. 
Matte~ is very complex, however, even if 11 app;Lehension 
could be adapted to the fine texture of substance 11 and 
substance were to be known, this would not.be of any 
practical ben~fit. But, in fact, we do not know the 
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fine texture and 11 the elementary terms of any description 
must--in that description, at least--remain undescribed; 
we must commend th~m to intuition."2 Description ma,y be 
made on the basis of the •!threads 11 we do perceive; 
however, those perceived threads are themselyes elementary 
terms of intuition and cannot be analyzed further. Ulti~ 
mate knowledge, that is, knowledge of all the material 
threads of the object in their act~al relations i$ 
impossible and at best a claim. Intuition gives some but 
not all of the material threads of the object and even 
those that intuition does give lack any o£ the external 
or actual relations possessed by material objects,. There-
fore, intuition cannot give knowledge of existence but 
must be content to supply the indubitable terms of experi-
ence which the spirit may take as symbols for matter. 
1santayana, 11Literal, ,. p. 430, 
2
rbid., p. 431, 
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D. Belief in the Meariirig of Intuition Initiates Knowledge 
Intuited essences cannot be belived in since they 
are non-existent and 11 to believe in anything is to believe 
th,at it exists. 111 Essences, then, may only have epistemoa 
logical value when intent transcends intuition and takes 
2 
essences for what they mean. This transcendence of 
intuition is only possible through the operation of animal 
faith. Animal faith as earlier than intuition assumes 
existence in the habitual response of the psyche to its 
environment while intuitions come merely to lend the 
animal something to posit. These accompanying intuitions 
are 11natural signs for the circle o;E objects and forces by 
which the habit is sustained .. 113 Hence, it becomes obvious 
that knowledge of existence comes when indubitable but 
unbelieve~-in essences are transcended while their intui-
tions become signs for whatever objects the psyche is 
materially predisposed to cope with. Santayana says: 
I have absolute assurance of nothing save of 
the character of some given essence; the rest is 
arbitrary belief or interpretation added by my 
animal impulse.4 
This arbitrary belief or interpretation is not, however~ 
unjustified for as santayana goes on to say: 
1santayana, 11Transcendental Absolutism, .. p, 317. 
2santayana, Scepticism, p. 65, 
4Ibid,, p, 110. 
3 Ibid., pp. l05-J.D7. 
• 
• 
Ideas become belief only when by precipitating 
tendencies to action they persuade me that they 
are signs of things; and these things are not those 
ideas simply hypostatised, ~ • • The belief is 
imposed on men surreptitiously by a latent mechani-
cal reaction of my body on the object producting the 
idea; it is by no means implied in any qualities 
obvious in that idea.l 
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Belief in an e~istence beyond our ideap, then, requires a 
transcendence of intuition and this transcendence of intui-
tion is a necessity of animal life. 
The appearance of essence must not be confused with 
the event of its appearance. The essence itself is logical 
or neutral or better yet eternal; it is non-existential 
and hence, cannot be a sign for existence~ It is the event 
of the appearance of essence that is tied to the latent 
mechanical reaction of the psyche and therefore, it is the 
event of the appearance of essence and not essence ~ 
essence that is taken as a sign of existence, Existence 
is attributed to appearance 11by the irrelevant momentum 
f ' 1 l'f 112 o my an~ma ~ e. For Santayana knowledge is knowledge 
of existence and, therefore, the non•existential data of 
consciousness must be put into external 11presumptive 
relations; 11 that is, the event of the appearance of 
essence must be taken as a sign for existence. According 
to Santayana; 
Whereas intuition of essence ~ • • is not knQwledge, 
because it has no ulterior object, the designation of 
2Ibid"'' p. 38. 
• 
some essence by some sign does convey knowledge 
••• of what essence was.~ 
The event of appearance~ then, is the reason for belief 
in existence, and the source of knowledge as to what 
71 
essence was for existence. Belief in existence or taking 
' the event of appearance £or a sign of existence, then, is 
necessary if knowledge is to be possible. 
E. Knowledge of Existence is Normally Symbolic 
As has been noted above, existence is externally 
related and the only indubitable data are essences which 
are internally related. For this reason, knowledge, 
which Santayana'equates with knowledge of existence, must 
be of essences placed in presumptive relations. To do 
this, intuitions become signs f9r existence ~nd dis-
course becomes symbolic.description of those existences 
in ter.ms of adventitious or presumptive relations. 
Knowledge of existence is gained through the inspection 
o~ a representation of the 0bject which is of our own 
creatioh, albeit~ guided by the habitual responses of the 
psyche to its envir0nment. The relevancy of the repre-
sentation to existence is due to the fact that existence 
and the intuition of that existence are n~aterially 
collateral, one comes to carry our th0ughts in the 
1Ibid., p. 169~ 
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direction of the other, and to give ~s prophetic knowledge 
f 't Ill 0 ~ • According to Santayana, the reason why intui-
tion carries thought in the direction of eX'istence is 
that: 
In knowledge of fact there is instinctive con-
viction and expectation, animal faith, as well as 
intuition of essences; and this faith (which is 
readiness to use some instinctive category) while 
it plunges us into a sea·of presumption, conjecture, 
error, and doubtJ at the same time sets up an 
ideal of knowledge~ transitive and realistic, in 
comparison with which intuition of essence, for all 
its infallibility, is a mockery. We might almost ~ 
say that sure knowledge, being immediate and 
instfuctive, is not real knowledge, while real 
knowledge> q~ing transiti¥e and adventurous, is 
never sure. 
Knowledge, then, is necessarily symbolic and transitivei 
however, as transitive the symbol may have a different 
status and form than its object, ~is is ideal, for 
Santayana goes on to sayt 
Were the representation a complete reproduction 
.•• it would~e no symbol, but simply one more 
thing, intransitive and unmeaning, like ~verything 
not made to be interpreted.3 
The insufficiency of intuition of essence for knowledge, 
then, is turned into the. sufficiency of knowledge when 
the event of the appearance is taken as a sign for 
existence and essence ~s consequently recognized for what 
it was. Knowledge of e~istence requires the placing of 
essences in presumptive relations based on the sign 
meanings· of the events.of intuition. 
1santayana:, "Literal, 11 p. 439. 
3 Ibid. , p. 43 7 ~ 
2Ibid., p._ 433. 
0 
0 
0 
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F. Imagination Makes Knowledge Possible 
For Santayana, symbols, considered as facts, 
have their own particular character which may be visual, 
audible, or verbal. ~e function of symbols, however, is 
"wholly and essentially transitive."! Since it is 
unli~ely that any one symbol would adequately mediate any 
complex system of external relations, it becomes impera-
tive to question how symbols are to be combined in order 
to represent existence? Symbols must be given an 
adventitious order if they are to represent any actual 
state of affairs in nature, Symbols, then, are woven 
into an adventitious representation of existence, but 
mere perception, though 11 originally true as a signal 
••• is fall.se as a description"r therefore, an appeal 
must be made to 11 intelligence and hypothesis, imagining 
and thinking."2 Symbols qua symbols cannot enter the 
citadel of existence except through "sympathetic imagi-
nation\ n 3 It is a sympathetic imagination that copies· 
or reproduces the actual relations in the thing signified 
by weaving symbols into a system of external relations. 
I 
Sympathetic imagination as inte:qt is a 11dramatic figment 
sort of ~eel.ing ... .4 Imagination or opinion, however, is 
not free floating, it is guided by the habitual response 
1Ibid., p. 438. 
4Ibid., p. 440 .. 
~Ibid., p. 443 • 
0 
0 
o£ the psyche to its environment. Santayana says: 
They are all creations of some living psyche, 
o£ human senses and pass~ons·stimulated and con-
trolled by external facts. They therefore are 
indicative, first~ of the life of the organism, 
its well being or distress, and secondly of th~ 
character o£ th~ environmenti expressed in 
language·of the psyche life. 
74 
Knowledge, then, is made possible by an imaginative intent 
guided by the lite of the anima~ which weaves its repre-
sentative object out of the available signs and symbols 
£or existence. 
G~ How Can Knowledge be Tested? 
Since only symbols and not facts ar~ transitiv~, 
the representation, if it were a perfect reproduction, 
would not be transitive, it would be a fact, just another 
object.2 A perfect reproduction is not the object itself 
and being intransitive could not be interpret~d~ ~rue 
knowledge is knowledge of external relations ·and according 
to Santayana: 
-
It is only the system of external re~ations into 
which the symbols are interwoven that copmes or re-
produces the same system of relations in the thing 
signified. 3 
As exisbence is a system o£ external relations, it is 
lsantayana, "Apologia," pp. 539-540 .. 
2santayana, "Literal," p. 437. 
only transitive symbols that may give 'true knowledge of 
existence. If this be true, then, how can the accuracy 
of knowled~~ be tested when·the object is likely 
nothing more than an object of intent? 
That the object of intent is objectively real is 
attested to by the obvious fact that bodily behavior is 
modified on the basis of such intended objects~ As 
stated above, it is bodily attitude which confirms 
beliefs in signified opjects, According to Santayaha~ 
Knowledge is knowledge because it has .compulsory 
·objects that pre-exist .••• I express in discourse 
the modified habits of an active being, plastic to 
experience, and capable of readjusting its organic 
attitude to other things on the same material plane 
of being with itsel£L L • ~ This attitude,· physical 
and practical; determine the object. of intent, 
which discourse is about_l 
.·-' 
Realism is confirmed in p~actical behavior •. Realism may 
p 
be philosophically rejected, however, in practical 
behayio~ it is assumed, man does not jump ~ut of the way 
of a speeding idea of an automobile. 
It is not bodily attitude alone which confirms 
the existence of the significate, it is bodily attitude 
75 
as a concomitant reaction of the organism to environmental 
stimulus, This concomitant reaction is the basis of 
knowledge.2 The ground of knowledge, then, is the 
1santayana, Scepticism, ·p. 172. 
2santayana, 11;Literal,n p. 425 .. 
0 
0 
0 I 
instinctive or habitual readjustment of the organism to 
its environment. For every sign there is a logically 
prior but chronologically concomitant physical reaction. 
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This cond6mitance encourages belief and belief consummates 
transitive knowledge. Santayana says: 
Transitive knowledge simpiy recognizes in a 
judgment the actual relation in which our living 
bodies stand to their environment •.•• The 
gift ..• is called sagacity.! 
Since organic reaction and intuition originate in the 
psyche, and the psyche is instinctive, it stands to 
reason that their should not be any contradiction. 
Santayana holds that such contradiction as may exist, 
lies in the implication of terms and this is admittedly 
adv~ntitious. Diversity of signs and description, how-
ever, are norma-l and involve no contradictions. 2 Although 
the 11 intrinsic and complete constitution 11 of the object 
cannot be known, its existence is assured by the fact 
that it can be pointed at, and its movements can be anti-
cipated "by reckoning it up in symbolic terms such as 
words. ,!3 Santayana says: 
The conclusion of our whole inquiry is that 
complete knowledge of natural objects cannot_.be 
hoped for. We know them by intent, based on 
'1 t' 4 bod1 y reac 1on ..•. 
2 Santayana, Scepticism, p. 176. 
3santayana, 11 Three Proofs, 11 p. 172. 
4santayana, 11Literal, 11 p. 443. 
0 
0 
0 
Adequate knowledge is transitive in intent and is not 
content to observe disembodied essences, its essences 
are essences of things affirmed by faith. 1 
The conclusion, then, is that knowledge is 
possiblei however, it is a knowledge qualified by the 
inherent insecurity of transcendent intent. According 
to Santayana, "knowledge •.. is belief": a belief 
that is "native to animals, and precedes all deliberate 
use of intuitions as signs or descriptions of things.n 
Beyond this, however, "knowledge is true belief'' or 
rather, "appropriate description."2 In recognition then 
of the limits of knowledge, Santayana says that "the 
ideal of knowledge is .. . . natural science. "3 Why 
natural science? 
It is only things on the scale of the human 
senses and in the field of those instinctive 
reactions which sensation calls·forth, that can 
be the primary objects of human knowledge: ... 
It is these instinctive reactions that select 
the objects of attention, designate iheir~locus 
and impose faith in their existence.-
77 
Only physical objects will stimulate instinctive reactmon 
and consequently only physical things can be the primary 
object of knowledge. We are not bound in discourse to 
physical things; however, knowledge in the sense of 
appropriate description can only be of physical things~ 
1Ibid.' p. 443. 
3Ibid., p. 181. 
2 Santayana, Scepticis~, p. 179 .. 
4Ibid. , p. 17 5 . 
• 
• 
• 
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H. Knowledge and Truth 
A proper treatment of the possibility of knowledge 
cannot be made until knowledge is seen in its relation to 
truth. Knowldge can only be meaningful if it is true 
knowleqge. Corq:r quotes Santayana as saying that the 
realm of truth is 11 that segment of the realm of essence 
which happens to be illustrated in existence. "1 That is, 
only that portion of the myriad of possible essences that 
is exhibited in existence is a part of the realm of truth. 
No matter how different these essences may be from one 
another, they cannot uexclude or contradict one another." 
In other words, ultimate knowledge.of truth would entail 
a knowledge of every essence exhibited in existence as 
simply what it is, that is, unrelated to any other 
essence. 
Such truth may only be attained by stepping up 
the ladder of "spiritual progress? 11 Santayana says; 
Life carries every sensitive animal as £ar up 
as appearance; intelligence raises him, at least 
in intention, to the level of truth; contemplation 
lifts him to that of2essence, and ecstasy into the heart of pure being. 
Such a knowledge of truth, however, cannot be attained 
1cory-.y", 11Some Notes on the Deliberate Philosophy 
of Santayana," p. 121 .. 
2santayana, 11 0n Metaphysical Projection, .. p. 120 . 
except in intent, hence, such knowledge remains out of 
reach as the naspect the universe would wear to omni-
science.111 As shown above, the animal may even attain, 
through ecstasy~ the heart of pure being which includes 
unmanifested as well as .manifested essence but 11 there is 
no way down from heaven to earth, from being to 
. 2 
existence. 11 Hence, ultimate truth is unattainable and 
even pure being once experienced cannot become knowledge 
of existence. In what sense, then, can attainable or 
transitive knowledge be true? Knowledge of existence can 
only be pragmatically true. Ten Hoor says: 
Ideation is valid if it fits the flux of 
perceptual experience; where purposes are con-
cerned, it isivalid if it promotes the ultimate 
synthesis of meaning and values.3 
Knowledge is, first of all, belief. The only indubitable 
data are essences, but essences are insufficient to 
knowledge, so, the animal must take his life in his hand 
and believe in what the event of the 'appearance of 
essence means. Thus, knowledge becomes symbolic and 
transitive and hence a beliefA It must, however, be more 
tha:n. belief -~e_.:J:: ~e:, it must be ''true belief 11 in the sense 
of 1'appropriat~ description. ,.4 Truth as appropriate 
1Ibid. ' p • 118 . 
2' Ibid. , p • 12 3 • 
3Ten Hoor, 11Santayana"~s Theory of Knowledge, II 
p. 209~ 
4santaya~a, Scepticism, p. 179. 
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descrip~ion is essentially pragmatic truth. According 
to Santayana: 
The relevance and truth of science, like the 
relevance and truth of sense, are pragmatic, in 
that they mark the actual relations, march and 
distribution of eventi, in terms of which they 
enter our experience .. 
In another place Santayana says: 
It is not resemhl~nce but relevance and close-
ness of adaption that renders a language expressive 
or an expression true.2 
It is clear, then, that for Santayana, knowledge of 
existence may only be pragmatically true. Pragmatic 
truth does not give the relations between actual things, 
but rather the actual relations in terms of which they 
:: i • 
enter our experience. Such truth is 11partly truth to 
oneself, partly workable convention and plausibility. n 3 
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To say, however, that there may be as many 
private truths as there are persons is to miss Santayana's 
meaning. Santayana clearly felt that pragmatic truth 
ought to have a public significance. Hence, 11 the word 
truth ought . • to be reserved for . the startdard 
comprehensive description of any fact in all its 
1George Santayana, Soliloquies in England (London: 
Constable and Co., Ltd., 1922), p. 257. 
2 . 
Santayana, Scepticism, p. 88. 
3santayana, Soliloquies in England, p. 83. 
• 
relations. 111 Knowledge of existence, then, is prag-
matically true and ought as such to give a standard and 
comprehensive description of existence by means o£ 
marking the ~ctual relations, in terms of which events 
enter our experience. 
There is a 11normal correspondence .. between 
knowledge and its object; however; it does not represent 
11 direct, exact, and complete knowledge of its object ... 
For this reason, 11Complete knowledge .. is impossible and 
we may be occasionally deceived by ~rror. 2 ~he possi-
bility of erro~ is a constant reminder of the fact that 
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knowledge is not literal, that is, knowledge of existence 
qua existence. According to Santayana: 
The happy results and fertility of an assumption 
do not prove it literally, but only prove it to be 
suitable •• 4'a good myth. The axioms of sanity 
and art must correspond somehow to truth, but the 
co~respondence may be very loose and very partial.3 
The test of an assumption, then, is its heuristic value~ 
On this point Santayana says: 
The naturalist . • • constructions, though no 
less hypothetical and speculative than the ideal-
ists dreams, are such legitimate and fruitful 
fictions that they are obvious truths ••.• 
Truth, at the intelligible level.4 
1santayana, SceEticism, p. 268. 
2santayana, 11Literal, 11 cf_. pp., 434-435 .. 
3santayana,_ SceEticism, p • 114. 
4santayana, The Life of Reason, p. 60. 
• 
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Although knowledge of things will never be literal, there 
is one other £orm of knowledge which does approach literal 
knowledge.- This type of know.!edge is called 11 literal 
psychology .. and of it Santayana says.:. 
Knowledge o£ discourse in other people, or of 
myself at other times, is what I call literary 
psychology. It is or may be ••• the most literal 
and adequate sort of knowledge of which a mind is 
capaple. • ~ • ·This rare adequacy o~ knowledge is 
attained by dramatic sympathy .•.• 1_ 
Literal knowledge, then, is only approachable in knowledge 
of discourse in oneself or others but knowledge of 
existence is belief and plagued by all of the uncertainties 
of animal faith • 
I. Some Problems Posed by Santayana•s Account 
of the Possibility o£ Knowledge 
The question should be raised here as to whether 
the definition of knowledge as "appropriate description 11 
or true knowledge (public) as a 11 standard comprehensive 
description o;f any fact in all its. relations 11 is equivalent 
to what is normally meant by the term truth~ If by truth 
is meant corresponding somehow or other to the actual or 
real world in some demonstratable manner, then, Santayana•s 
concept of what would be true is inadequate, For 
Santayana all demonstration depends on animal faith; hence, 
1santayana; Scepticism, pp. 173-174 • 
• 
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to demonstrate that something is true is merely to believe 
• 
that it is true. Howeve~, this belief is not unwarranted, 
it is guided by the re~ponses of the psyche to its environ-
ment. If this belief is publicly acceptable in terms of a 
11 standard coxnp~ehensive description, 11 then it is p~obably 
that the desc~iption is true in a more ultimate sense than 
~ 
mere animal preference. The publicity, then, of any 
~tandard and comprehensive description implie~ that it is 
true of existence in its actual relations, however, 
knowledge must remain a belief~ This conclusion naturally 
follows from a dualistic epistemology which stresses the 
independence of the object while holding that that object 
must be known by means of transitive symbols which are in 
no way constituent elements of the actual object~ 
Santayana simply seems to be stating categorically what 
dualistic epistemologists grudgingly admit, the basic 
insecurity of mediated knowledge. In the absence of 
absolute certainty, knowledge becqmes belief, albeit 
warranted belief. 
Santayana•s meaning of the word truth or true 
does not appear to be contrary to the normal applications 
of true and trutht althoug~, it is antithetical to the 
assurance that is associated with these terms. For 
., 
example, when, say, two people agree on the identity of 
an object, the agreement or publicity of their statements 
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about that object is the basis fo~ their assurance of the 
truth of their statements. What people mean by true or 
truth is the publicity and comprehensiveness of descrip-
tions although the absolute assurance that they lend the 
terms true and truth is unwar~anted, B£U sequitur, because 
of the inherent insecurity of symbolic knowledge. The 
conclusion, then, is that Santayana•s conception of true 
and truth is behavioristically true ~o the normal ~ of 
these terms; although his meaning is not the accepted 
meaning of these terms. 
A second problem is concerned with an over-
emphasis of_the role of imagination in acquiring knowledge 
of existence. If the psyche responds to only special 
stimuli on special occasions and is thus guided by habit, 
then, the intuitions of essences are not chaotic and 
have already some system or rhythm prior to their pre-
sentation to the spirit. This is the reason why the 
psyche makes intelligent responses possible~ and further, 
this is the reason why animal faith, expressed through 
the habitual responses of the psyche, guides the spirit 
towards true knowledge. Santayana depicts the spirit as 
presented with a myriad of unrelated essences (certainly, 
if _this was all the spirit had to go on, imagination 
would necessarily have to play the major role), however, 
these essences although unrelated to any other essence 
• 
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are very much related to an intuition which is a conse-
quent of the habitual psychejs response to some special 
stimuli on some special occasion. It appears quite 
obvious that essences which are necessarily tied in per-
ception to some intuition which, along with every other 
intuition, presents itself to the spirit in a definite 
order or system as predeter.mined by the habitual responses 
of the psyche, have an order already and do not require 
any extensive us.e of imagination or "fancy. 11 It does 
appear, then, that there need be an excessive emphasis 
upon the role of imagination or 11 fancy 11 in knowing. 
A third problem is concerned with the failure of 
Santayana to make clear the role of quasi or even non-
instantiative particulars such as symbols in allowing for 
a realm of discourse and knowledge which is not tied to 
some present environmental cue. Granted the spirit in 
fixing an idea in memory accumulates a storehouse of 
instruments of expression, however, spirit as immaterial 
has no power or agencyi hence, it cannot of itself 
initiate thinking. It would seem as if the self, being 
prepared in every way except as a material agency for 
thinking in the absence of instantiative particulars, 
must wait for a ,push from its environment before it can 
begin. If this be the case, however; having once been 
• 
• 
• 
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stimulated, ~he psyche has a predetermined set of habitual 
responses and consequent intuitions of essences, and hence, 
thinking in the absence of at least some environmental 
cues becomes impossible. The question that arises and one 
that Santayana does not answer is: How ma~r thinking in 
the absence of environmental cues take place, as experi-
ence suggests that it does take place? 
CHAPTER V 
THE.RO~E OF ESSENCE SUMMARIZED AND CRITICIZED 
• 
• 
• 
In this chapter the role or function of essences 
in the epistemology of Santayana wil~ be summarized and 
criticized. To do this essences will be considered in 
terms of the nature of essence, the function of essence, 
the relation of essence to the spirit, essence and think-
ing, and essence and truth. The apparent strengths will 
be given in the course of each summarization whereas a 
consideration of the apparent weaknesses will be given as 
a conclusion to each subtopic. 
A. The Nature of Essence 
The nature of essence, in terms of its most dis-
tinctive quality, is the 'non-existence of essence. Con-
sidering the claim of Santayana that essences are the 
only indubitab~e data of.experienca they become mPs0 
facto the basis of any know~edge of e~istence. The 
question naturally arises as to how non-existent essences 
can give knowledge of existence? This question will be 
considered under subtopic B, 11 The Function of Essence, .. 
however, here the main concern will be why; according to 
Santayana, essences may not be considered to be either 
physica~ or mental~ 
For Santayana the fundamenta~ duality of sign and 
object is undeniable as is the fact that sign and object 
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are "materially collate:r:al" the former bringing, via 
thought, "prophetic knowledge 11 of the latter. 1 To say 
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that signs or essences, taken as meaning existence, bring 
knowledge of the object o:r: existence is not to say that 
essences are constituent elements of existence. In fact 
essences, which may only have internal relations, could 
not exist, for, according to Santayana: 
Existence if a conjunction of natures in 
adventitious and variable relations. [Hence] 
• • • it is evident that existence can never 
be giv~n in intuition .•.. 2 
Santayana, then, by definition establishes the exclusive 
duality of sign and object. Essences as the indubitable 
data of experience are immediate, simple, and unrel~ted, 
whereas existence is "a conjunction of natures in adventi-
tious and variable relations." 
To deny that essences are constituent elements of 
their intended objects is to say that essences are not 
and cannot be physical~ However, it is understanda~~e that 
they should be consid~red so. On this point Santayana 
says that to assert that essences are a part of the object 
itself is a "hypostasis of symbols" 0r 11 sensuous idolatry~" 
:However: 
1santayana, "Literal, 11 p. 339. 
2santayana, Scepticism, p. 48 . 
0 
0 
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Such sensuous idolatry is constitutional in 
the animal mind, because its intended object is 
whatever external existence may be acting upon 
it, while its data are essences evoked by the 
organ of perception. Perception is thus origin-
ally true as a signal but false as a description. 
1 
. . . 
Essences are simply ••predicates" or "poetic epithets for 
that substance, not contituents of it. 112 According to 
Sanayana, 11 signs cannot be parts of what they signify, nor 
essences parts of things." In fact 11What qualities shall 
be found in or attributed to an object is 
by the structure of the organ, not by .. . 
determined 
• the object. n 3 
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If, then, the appearance of qualities are determined by the 
structure of the organ, why could essences not be considered 
mental?-
Before considering the issue of why essences cannot 
be considered mental, a judgment must be made as to the 
value of non-physical essences. lf essences were to· b~ 
considered as constituent elements of their object, how 
could the fact of error be accounted for? According to 
Santayana: 
Error thus awakens even the laziest philosophy 
from the dream of supposing that its meanderings 
are nothing hut strands in the texture of its 
object.4 
1santayana, 11Literal, 11 p. 440. 
2sap.tayana, 11Some Meanings of the Word Is, 11 p. 372. 
3santayana, nLiteral, 11 p. 441. 
4santayana; Scepticism, p. 123. 
Santayana, then, has a strong empiric~! argument here, 
for error is a fact and to consider sense contents as 
physical constituents of their intended objects would 
seriously strain any account of error. 
Essences are neutral, logical, and non-existent, 
or, to put it another way, 11 Sheer possibles" and they will 
only exist, as new facts, existents, when they are 
included "in the material or in the spiritual chain of 
1 
contingent events. 11 That is, in the material chain of 
contingent events as ~he forms of existence, or in the 
spiritual chain of contingent events as "distinguishable 
features in a total field of apprehension." 2 Essences in 
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themselves are neutral but 11charged [by the particular 
organ of sense] ~ . • with emotional and sentimental 
values 11 and as such 11are phychical in quality and status. 113 
What Santayana is saying, then, is that essences e~ibited 
in intuition which have not yet been taken as a sign for 
some intended object are truly neutral and non-existent, 
but as taken as a sign and given a moral colour by the 
animal intuitions of essences take on a psychical quality 
and status and further, as included in s·ome material or 
spiritual chain of contingent events they take on existence 
4 
as new facts. Essences, then, are neutral and non-existent 
1santayana, "Apologia," p. 522. 
3Ibid., p. 523. 4Ibid., cf., p"" 523"" 
• 
• 
• 
~ut drop their neutral and non-existent status when given 
a moral colour (that is, interpreted) by some animal. 
Santayana, therefore, denies that essences are 
mental aThthough they may, as interpreted by the organs 
of sense, take on a physhical quality and status. If, 
however, the nature of essence is considered to be neither 
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physical nor mental they necessarily take on some ontologi-
cal status. According to Santayana: 
' Essences have the texture and ontological status 
of Platonic ideas,, [but] • • • can lay claim to none 
of the cosmological, metaphysical, or moral perogatives 
attributed to those ideas. They are infinite in 
number and neutral in value.l 
It is interesting that a confirmed naturalist would 
abandon the realm of the nominalists simple, immediate, 
and unrelated sense-contents, to account for knowledge in 
terms of universals. Santayana says: 
Existence naturally precedes any idealization 
of it which men can contrive (since they, at least, 
must exist first), yet in the order of values 
knowledge of existence is subsidiary to knowledge 
of ideals.2 
Hence, to escape making essences either phy~~c~l or mental 
Santayana has had to make essences universals. However, 
why could essences not be considered as either physical 
or psychical? 
1
santayana, Scepticism, pp. 77-78. 
2santayana, The Life of Reason, p. 427 . 
•••• 
Among those who have criticized Santayana for the 
claim that one may have knowledge of existence by means 
of neutral and non~existent essences is Calkins who says: 
The critical realists may not • . . both con-
ceive essences as detached alike from physical 
and mental existents, and also as constituting 
the very nature of these existing things.l 
This criticism, however, is inadeguate for Santayana does 
not claim that essences constitute the very nature of 
existing things. For Santayana essences are the forms 
that existence sheds in order to change, in fact, without 
the help of substance essence would never "pass from its 
ideal possibility into selected and instant being."2 
' Essences, then, do not constitute the very nature of 
existing things, they are simply the- for.ms that existence 
might wear and exchange in its flow. Essences are simply 
signs for existence. 
In Chapter I, subtopic c, "The New Problem of 
Critical Realism," ;Butler is quoted as claiming that the 
critical realists have exaggerated the dualistic dilemma 
by introducing the realm of essences; Certainly if 
essences were considered to be sense-contents and psychi-
cal in nature the problem would be sim~lified. Why not~ 
1Mary Calkins, "On Certain Di'fficulties in Modern 
Doctrine of Essences," Journal of Philosophy, XXIII 
(December 23, 1926), p. 704. 
2santayana, The Life of Reason, p. 434. 
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• t~en, consider essences to be S®.SI=-contents, psychical 
in nature? Marten Ten Hoor makes this suggestion in 
the following manner. He says: 
Why does the animal point or attend to an object? 
. • • If ~owledge implies tbelief posited in faith 
and action( we must necessarily inquire into the 
grounds of this belief, ••. The animal 1points~ 
because he •senses. 1 1 
When the environment stimulates the underlying organs of 
sense why are not sense-contents evoked rather than 
essences? ~en Hoor goes on to say that if one takes the 
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object to have been sensed the experie~ce of sensing could 
be explained as a "reverberation or mere momentu.ni. of the 
neutral mechanism. 112 :r:n other words, if one holds to 
sensing there is a possibility of a scientific account 
whereas, if one holds to an intuiting of non-existent 
essences there is no apparent account of how an intuition 
takes place. Ten Hoor, then, along wi ~h Butler f'eels 
that the "intuition [of] essences 'seems an unnecessary. 
compli-cation. "3 
The denial by Santayana that essences are payc~i-
~aa~ or constituent elements of their objects seems quite 
valid, qllow~ng for the fact of error and the monistic 
1Marten Ten Hoor, Review of Scepticism and 
Animal Faith by George Santayana~ XX (November ,22, 
1923), pp. 660-~61. I. 
2Ibid., p. 662. 3Ibid .. , p. 661, 
0 
0 
0 
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~ilemma. However, the denial that essences are mental 
or psychical in quality does not appear to serve any 
useful function. It does not even rule out the subjectiv-
ism of the assertion that all we know immediately are our 
own .sense•contents. Even according to Santayanats scheme, 
all we can know indubitably are our own intuitions of 
essence and if they are to represent existence at all, 
they must be given an adventitious order which is not 
intrinsic to their own nature. The introduction, then, of 
non-existent and n~utral essences does not serve any 
necessary function, and consequently, tends to complicate 
an already tedious epistemological dualism. 
a. The Function of Essence 
Essence qua essence is simply nanything definite 
capable of appearing or-being thought of."1 On ·the other 
hand: 
The realm of essence • ~ • is simply the 
unwritten catalogue, prosaic, and infinite, of 
the characters possessed by such things as happen 
to exist, together with the characters which all 
different things would possess if they existed.2 
As may be seen f~om the above, essences qua essences have 
no function, ~hey just are. However, essences are used 
by substance in order to facilitate change and they are 
1santayana, "Transcendental Abso;Lutism," p. 317. 
2santayana, Scepticism, p. 77. 
• used by the self when they are taken as signs for 
existence~ Essences, then, have no agency (all power is 
in the inner unrest of matter) their function consists 
in the manner in which they are used. 
As discussed in the preceding subtopic, essences 
function in existence to allow for change and multiplic-
ity. Santayana says.: 
A changing world is defined at each moment or 
in each movement by the essence of that moment or 
of that movement; and when it drops that pattern 
or that trope, the essence then dismissed remains, 
in its Aogical identity, precisely the essence 
that it was during that manifestation and before 
it. Were it not the same essence throughout, it 
could not be picked up or dropped, recognized, or 
contrasted w~th the forms that existence might 
wear sooner or later. ~e eternal self-identity 
of every essence is therefore a condition for the 
possibility of change; and complete as the realm 
of essence is and unaffected in its ideal infinity, 
and unaffected there by the evolution of things, 
yet it is intimately interwoven, by its1very eternity, with this perpetual mutation. 
Essence does not i~terject itself into the flow of 
existence, rather, matter has 11 dynamic priority'' and is 
- 2 
11 t.he seat and principle of genesis. 11 Essences, then, 
function in existence as the condition, but not the 
instigator, of change. 
The other function of essence, and perhaps the 
most important, is to bring knowledge of existence, that 
1santayana, uTranscendental Absolutism, .. pp. 315-
316. 
2santayana, 11Apologia, 11 pp. 525~526. 
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is, when essences are transcended and taken as a sign 
' 
for existence.1 The movements of existence, defined at 
each momept by some essence, st~ulates the psyche and 
consequently some ••essence impo,ses itself upon the mind. •• 2 
According to Santayana; 
Transitiveness in knowledge has two stages or 
leaps: the leap of intuition, from the state of 
the living organism to the consciousness of some 
essence; and the leap of faith or action, from the 
symbol actually given in sense or thought to some 
ulterior existing object,3 
The first stage is accomplished when the psyche is 
stimulated by the environment. The second state, the 
leap of faith, is accomplished when the sterile essence 
is charged wi~h transcendent intent and becomes a symbol 
for some e~istent posited in faith. 4 Essence, then, has 
a transitive function only when a 11 transcendent inten):. 11 
takes it as- a symbol for some 11ulterior existing object. 11 
Animal faith makes essence vehicular, as has been 
shown above, but what is the justification for animal 
faith? Animal faith requires no vindication, it is a 
fundamental assumption of all experience and is the basis 
·of reason itself.5 The critic of Santayana faces a real 
1santayana, SceEticism, p. 65. 
2
santayana, 11Apologia, II p. 528. 
3santayana, 11Three Proofs, .. p. 183-. 
4santayana, 11Literal, 11 p. 433, 
5santayana, 11Apologia; 11 p. 581.. 
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dilemma here, if he allows animal faith, then non-existent 
essences may become vehicles of knowledge and, on the other 
hand, i.f he denies the validity of anima·l faith, then he 
rules out the whole realm of habitual or instinctive 
activity. For example, Santayana says; 
The symbol taken as a fact, has an assignable 
character of its own--visual, audible, or verbal--
but taken functionally it is wholly and essentially 
transitive.l. 
The whole question of whether essences are descriptive or 
transitive turns on the word ''taken." S~ntayana says: 
.. 
To consider an essence is, from a spiritual 
point of view to enlarge acquaintance with true 
being; but it is not even to broach knowledge of 
.factr and the ideal object so defined may have 
no natural significance, though ii has aesthetic 
immediacy and logical definition. 
Therefore, when essence becomes a symbol it only becomes 
so when it is taken as meaning something which is ~oreign 
to its naturek Again, when essence becomes a transitive 
vehicle of knowledge it only becomes so when it is taken 
as meaning some ulterior object which is not, ipso facto, 
necessary by virtue of its mere presence to spirit. 
Hence~ to allow Santayanaks conception of animal faith is 
to allow neutral and non-existent essences to become 
transitive symbols with extensive descriptive powers. 
1santayana, "Literal," p. 438 .. Italics mine. 
2 Santayana, Scepticism, P~ 75. 
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In the above consideration of essence it has been 
noted that transitive knowledge requires a mediating 
vehicle in order to pass f~om the intuition of essences 
to a knowledge of existence. ltwas further noted that 
the symbol could serve such a function. HoweverA it was 
observed that a symbol is only taken as a fact having its 
own characteristics and only taken functionally·as 
transitive. In other words, the transitive symbol or the 
mediating vehicle, is nothing but an essence charged with 
meaning which is not intrinsic to its nature by a 
transcendent intent based on animal faith. 
How, then, can non~existent essences give 
knowledge of existence? They cannot, for, as was already 
cited above, "to consider • • • essence • . ~ £rom a 
spiritual point of view ~ •• is not even to broach 
knowledge of fact. " Knowledge of existence comes by means 
of a transcendent intent based on animal faith. 
It is a serious weakness in Santayana's scheme 
that the indubitable data of experience, essence, cannot, 
unembellished by animal faith, give knowledge of existence. 
I£ essences maintain their ideality they can give no 
knowledge of existence. What good are indubitable data 
of experience if they give no knowledge o~ fact? As soon 
as animal faith turns essence into a symbol of existence, 
it hasi essentially, made over a neutral essence into a 
• 
• 
psychical sense-content having assignable qualities of 
its own. If, then, essences are impotent qua essences 
and become sense-contents as a result of the operation 
of animal faith, why not call essences sense contents? 
This conclusion is in agreement with the conclusion o£ 
subtopic A, 11 The Nature o£ Ess~nce. 11 In fact, if 
essences are conceivably mental and symbols are 
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essentially sense-contents~ that is, they have assignable 
characteristics of their own, then the concept of non-
existent and neutral essences appears superfluous. 
c. The Relation of Essence to Spirit 
Spirit is not the same thing as the psyche, 
11 spirit is '-consumation• • . • this consumation is not 
rare or occasional but accompanies the whole orchestra-
l 
tion of life... Spirit, as carried along in the psyche, 
arises in response to 11 the vicissitudes of . . • ·a_nimal· 
life-. 112 Spirit merely endures the action of psyche and 
cannot act in itself. 3 Spirit, as the actualization of 
nature becomes for nature 11 the sense and knowledge of 
its own existence •• A Spirit, however, is subservient 
11 to mat~rial modes of.being 11 and hence perception becomes 
1santayana, ' 11Apologia, 11 p. 541. 
2santayana, Sce:eticism, p • 276. 
3santayana, 11Apologia, 11 p. 570 .. 4Ibid., p. 521. 
0 
·0 
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a ''stretching forth of intent beyond intuition'' by means 
of intelligence which is the "most ideal function of 
spirit • ".1 Santayana says i 
Xdeas become beliefs only when by precipitating 
tendencies to action they persuade me that they are 
signs of things; and these things are not those 
ideas simply hypostatized. • • • The belief is 
imposed on me serreptitiously by a latent mechanical 
reaction of my body on·the object producing the 
idea; it is by no means implied in any qualities 
obvious in that idea.2 
The relation of essence to spirit, then, is that neutral 
and non-existent essences are transcended by a spirit 
which is subservient to the mechanical reaction of the 
psyche to its environment. 
All power is in matter, therefore the material 
psyche must act in the immaterial spiriti The essences 
evoked by the reaction of the psyche to its environment 
are present to the spirit, which is to be emotion and 
light for that activity, yet the data of intuition must 
be transcended if knowledge of existence is to be forth-
coming. However, transcendence of the data of intuition 
is an act of animal faith and animal faith is manifested 
by the material psyche and not the immaterial spirit. 
The activity of the psyche, then, is both prior to the 
intuition of essence and the means whereby the data of 
101 
1santayana, Scepticism, p. 282. 2Ibid., p. 16. 
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intuition are transcended thereby allowing for knowledge 
of existence. 
Since matter, or in the case of knowledge, the 
material psyche, does all. of the work spirit gua spirit 
is reduced to a contemplative and retentative function. 
Spirit, "while existentially carried along" in the flux 
of matter ''arrests ;::orne datum, lending it an ideal unity, 
fixity, and moral color,."1 Spirit, then, simply peruses 
the essences presented to it in the flux of existence and 
fixes those data with all of their :·concomitant moral 
color added by the material psyche in its adventures. 
It is hard to see just how Santayana could expect 
anything so impotent as spirit to affect the material 
ps~che. Santayana says: 
The environment determines the occasions on 
·which intuitions arise, the psyche-~the inherited 2 
organization of the animal--determines their form. 
What, then, does the spirit do? 
Spirit has no interests, no curiosity, no animal 
impatience; and as it arises only when and where 
nature calls it forth, so it surveys only what 
nature happens to spread before it.3 
Spirit, then, surveys what nature manifests to it, but 
what is the nature of this survey? 
1
santayana, "Apologia, 11 p. 530. 
2
santayana, Scepticism, p. 88. 
• 
• 
Spi~it a~ises in response to the activity of the 
psyche and consequently 11essence • . • symbolizes an 
object to which the animal i.s te;ntatively addressed. 111 
The 11attitude 11 of being addressed to an object shows 
itself either in movements available to 11 gross exter;nal 
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observation'' viz,, pointing to the moon or in an attitude 11 
confined to the inner readjustments .[of] ••• the 
psyche (viz.] •• ~ attention, expectation, deliberation, 
.. d • ..2 memory, or es~re. These attitudes provide the 
11habitual background 11 out o;E which essences derive their 
meaning while the catalogue of remembered essences as 
well as 11master-esse;nces, 11 which are our attitudes 
toward things not essences, further aid in the organization 
f . 3 o exper~ence. Spirit, then, in surveying what nature 
manifests, classifies those experiences in terms of 
present attitudes towards essences just manifested and 
past attitudes toward things ( 11master-essences 11 ) • 
Spirit further surveys nature through the 
11intellectual powers of ••. attention, synthesis, (and] 
perception .. ,.4 Attention takes place 11because the an;imal 
i.s ·forming habits 11 or responding to its environment, 
while synthesis takes place when a particular impression 
merges with the "responsiveness of the organ affected11 
1 Ibid,, p, 276. 
3Ibid,, P•. 277. 
2Ibid., pp._276-277. 
4Ibid., p. 281. 
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which modifies the reaction called for by that impression 
on the basis of the report of many other impressions. 1 
Perception is, quite simply, the transcending of intuition 
by intent. Santayana says, 11perception points to what it 
does not, save by pointing, know to exist, 112 Spirit, then, 
although it is immaterial, demonstr~tes its subservience 
to nature in giving knowledge of nature. 
There is a fundamental weakness in Santayana's 
account here for he assigns· .to spir;i. t the function o;E gain-
ing knowledge of existence yet he does not give any ade-
quate account of how this knowledge may aid the habitual 
psyche. The problem, then, is how may spirit use this 
knowledge to affect the active psyche? Cory, quoting 
Santayana says, 11the freedom and glory of essence comes 
from its impotence, 11 and further 11 ;i.ts essence is.to be 
light, not •• ·• power~ 113 Santayanals spi;r-;i.t is epi-
phenomenal, it 11 is only an intermittent light that plays 
over but does not intervene in the material processes of 
nature, 114 Santayana does not consider spirit as a!ien to 
matter for i;E it were, ''perception • • • would be a miracle 
and an impos'sibili ty ... s One could safely conclude, then, 
that matter does affect spirit but that spirit cannot 
affect matter. on this point Santayana says~ 
1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 383. 
3cory, 11Some Notes on the J)eliberate Philosophy of 
Santayana, .. p, 123. Quoted from The Realms of Being, p. 643. 
4Ibid., p. 123. Ssantayana, Scepticism, p. 282. 
My materialism rega~ds the mind as purely 
expressive; there is no mental machinery; the 
underground· work is ·'all done by the organism, 
in the psyche, or in what people call the un-
conscious mind.l 
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Santayana cannot satisfactorily account for the fact that 
we do change our ways of thinking and acting on the basis 
of what is learned in experience. 2 According to 
Santayana's analysis, spirit cannot affect the activity 
of the material psyche for it is purely expressive. Of 
what possible value, then, is knowledge of existence if 
it is possessed by an impotent spirit which is unable to 
af£ect the material psyche or aid the psyche in dealing 
with its environment? 
D. Essences and Thinking 
In Santayana*s epistemology there is a heavy 
emphasis on the behavioristic accompaniments of thinking 
rather than on thinking itself. This is due, primarily, 
to the fact that spirit only exists for the actualization 
of nature in essence and essences are only manifested when 
1santayana, "Apologia," ·pp. 579-580. 
2santayana does attempt an answer to this problem 
when he says "Spiritual lives are facts •••• Nor is this 
taste of liberty altogether momentary •••• Spiritual 
insights induce a new habit, open a path to a deeper 
stratum of the soul. The heart has found a truer good, 
and does not forget it. 11 ("Apologia, 11 p. 569) However, 
he still fails to show how the spiritual insights of an 
impotent spirit~.could possihl¥ change a habit in the 
material psyche. 
• 
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some psyche is responding to the flux of his environment. 
Hence, without environmental stimulation, there can be no 
manifestation of essence to spirit and without this mani-
festation of essence there can be no spirit, consciousness, 
or thought. For this reason Ten Hoor says, 11thought [for 
Santayana] is merely the .froth and foam on the surface of 
.flux. 111 ')!.he main issue to be analyzed here, then, is 
given the conceptual framework of Santayana~s epistemology, 
what is the value of thinking? 
In Santayana•s account of knowledge, essences are 
the indubitable and unanalyzable elements of what may be 
known~ He says: 
All ultimate elements in what is known--including 
their primary relations--must be known by intuition; 
they are data given absolute~y and unbuttressed by any 
reasons, ~ •• The elementary terms o£ any description 
must--in that description, at least--remain undes-
cribed; we must commend them to intuition.2 
Knowledge, however, is knowledge of ~xistenc~, which is a 
conjunction o.f natures in external relat.ions, whereas 
essences·have only internal relations. Essences, then, 
are in themselves insufficient for knowledge of .existence. 
If essences are to represent existence they must be taken 
as signs by animal faith and be deployed in a syst~m of 
external relations, 
1Marten Ten Hoor, 11Santayana;ts Theory of Knowledge, .. 
Journal of Philosophy, XX (April 12, 1923), p. 207. 
2santayana, 11Literal, 11 p. 431. 
For Santayana, then; essences, before they can 
become transitive symbols, must be taken as meaning some 
ulterior object and symbols, before they can represent 
existence, must be·woven into a system of external 
relations. Individual perceptions may truly be a sign 
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for existence; however, if existence is to be symbolically 
represented, an appeal must be made, 11 imagining and think-
ing_111. For Santayana, then, there cannot be any descrip-
tion (knowledge) of exi~tence without thinking and 
imagining. Why is imagining necessary? Imagining is 
necessary in order to give externaL relations to 
essences, or, in other words, to 11 imagine the object" 
rather than individual essences which are ins~fficient 
2 for knowledge, What is the impetus to imagine our 
object? Reaso~ consciously interprets nature by means of 
11 the function of imagination or -*fancy. ~ n 3 However, 
11there is no dilemma in the choice between animal faith 
and reason, because reason is only a for,m of animal 
faith. ,.4 Hence, the whole process of knowledge, from the 
intuition of essence to the interpretation of nature; may 
1rbid. J p.. 440 • 
2santayana, 11Apologia,n cf;, PP~ 515-516. 
3Butler, The ~nd 0f Santayana, p. 56. 
4santayana, Scepticism, p. 383. 
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be explained in ter.ms o~ an animal positing and represent-
ing existence in faith. 
As has been noted in Chapter I, error may be used 
as an argument against epistemological monism; however, 
Santayana would have to admit that error was also a sign 
of imagining and thinking, and, more specifically, think-
ing in the awareness of error. Santayana ~ays; 
I cannot prolong or intensify discourse without 
soon coming upon what I call interruption, confusion, 
doubt, or contradiction. An impulse to select, to 
pursue, and to reject specific essences insinuates 
itself into discourse.l 
Certainly Santayana could explain this confusion in terms 
of a waywa.rd· 11attention upon" esse~ces, 2 but the discri-
mination that is implied in "douht'' and the awareness of 
"contradiction" must be considered as thinking. Certainly 
criticism, which comes as a result of contradiction must 
be considered thinking. It might be questioned, however1 
why make a case for thinking since Santayana admits think-
ing? 
Santayana does not deny thinking, in fact, he 
s~ys that "the self involved in discourse is a thinking 
. d .. 3 ml.Il • However~ what Santay,an~ does deny is that 
"mental discourse" can be a self or psyche, for. "it is 
all surface; it neither precedes, nor survives, no~ 
1:rbid., p. 136,. 
3Ibid., p. 147. 
2Ihid .. , p. 137. 
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guides, nor posits its datai it mereLy notes and remembers 
1 them." As was noted in the preceding subtopic, spirit 
merely becomes knowledge of nature by means of its actu-
alization in essences present to the spirit. In the con-
elusion to that discussion it was decided that knowledge 
of existence which cannot affect the manner in which the 
psyche deals with its environment is worthless. Santayana)s 
assertion that particularly illuminating insights of the 
spirit may occasionally change the psyche~s habits is 
inadequate, for the development and/or change of habit is 
a time consuming thing, and it is a fact of experience that 
new knowledge may initiate an immediate change in the way 
a self responds to any environmental situation. The issue 
that ~ust be decided here isi is there any value in thought, 
considering the stultifying limits on thinking that have 
been imposed by Santayana? 
The denial of any power to influence actions to 
thinking must be considered one of the most impornant 
weaknesses of Santayana's epistemological scheme, Munitz 
says; 
If we draw a sharp line between the mechanical 
and the mental, putting all efficacy in the former, 
then thought becomes truly impotent and redundant 
in the march of events, a helpless spectator having 
no practical control over the instruments and 
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conditions of its activity. 1 
This is a fair statement concerning the fate of thought 
in Santayana•s system, and in the light of the above 
stated question concerning the value of such thought, 
thinkin~ must be regarded as an unwqrthy labor for a self 
concerned with the practical pursuits of life~ 
A further criticism of Santayana on this point 
is that of Ten Hoor, who says; 
Santayana fails to note that certain facts true 
enough about thought in its genesis, are not true 
about thought in its maturity. Although action is 
purely instinctive in its first stages, a conscious-
ness of its purpose makes it a power where it ~as,a 
fo~ce.2 
It certainly is very difficult in the light of experience 
to say that the thinking mind conscious of its own 
purposes is unable to affect the activity of its body or 
of its own thoughts. For example, one may have always 
brushed his teeth with long horizontal movements, yet on 
the advice of his dentist immediately switch to short 
vertical ones. Or perhaps one may have always thought 
Negroes to be mentally inferior but upon reading a text~ 
book in differential psychology, may completely change 
his thinking on this subject. The range of examples that 
could be given is infiniter however, the theory that 
1Karl Milton Munitz, The Moral Philosophy of 
Santayana (New York: The Humanities Press, 1958), p. 36. 
2Ten Hoor, "San-t;:ayana"s Theory of Knowledge, 1' 
P~ 207. 
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thought is powerless is so contrary to everyday experi-
ence that further examples are not necessary. The denial 
then, of any power to thought to influence the activity 
of the self is perhaps the most serious weakness in 
Santayana 1 s epistemology. 
E. Essences and Truth 
The relationship between knowledge and truth has 
been dealt with in detail in Chapter IV, subtopic H~ 
entitled "Knowledge and Truth," in which we found that 
knowledge of existence is only pragmatically true; that 
is, true in the sense of being a standard and compre-
hensive. description of existence. The problem to be 
analyzed here is the role essence plays in the knowledge 
of truth. 
For Santayana, the goal of life is not to have 
true knowledge, it is, rather, to be absorbed into the 
very being of truth. He says: 
When naturalism • . . had been firmly rooted 
in my mind, the other half of the total problem 
spontaneously came to the fore. What , ~ • is 
the nature and possible virtue of man? On what 
. . '·· can he set his heart? • • • Only on the life 
of reason, only on union with the truth, only on 
ideal sympathy with that irrepressable spirit 
wh~ch comes to light on all human beings, flowering 
differently in eachi and moving in each towards a 
special perfection. 
1santayana, The Idler and His Works And Other 
Essays, p. 17. 
This union with truth is not a union with a world-soul 
or anything like that, it is, rather, the forgetting of 
ones "temporal status and perus[ing] both temporal and 
eternal things in their truth, that is, under the form 
of eternity."1 To do this is to take off "the garment 
of existence 11 by refusing to take the datum of intuition 
as a sign for existence and to consider it simply as 
"that which it inherently, logically, and unchangeably 
is"--essence. 2 If, however,. 11 intuition •• ~ preserves 
[the] . . . insecurity proper to the flux of existence" 
while informing the spirit about existence, then 11the 
bright flower of consciousness [is shed] as a useless 
husk," 3 Then, in the absence of consciousness spirit is 
separated from the truth. 
For Santayana~ then, there are two forms of 
truth. There is truth in the sense of "appropriate 
description 11 which occurs when the animal clothes an 
essence with existence by taking it as a sign for 
existence, and there is the truth in the more absolute 
sense which occurs when the spirit refuses to take 
essence for anything other than what it is. Santayana 
1s an tayana, "Apo+ogia, II p. 585. 
2 Santayana, Scepticism, p. 39. 
3santayana, "Apologia, II p. 585. 
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chooses the latter form of truth for himself. 1 However, 
as was noted above, to take essences as signs for 
existence is to shed ''the bright flower of consciousness 11 
and to suffer the "insecurity proper to the flux of 
existence." The choice, then, is up to the anima! to 
' 
either seek "union with the truth" by forgetting his own 
"temporal. status" and seeing all things "under the form 
of eternity," or to clothe essence with existence by 
taking it as a sign of existence and seek the only truth 
possible concerning existence--pragmatic truth. 
Essence~ then, as the indubitable and ultimate 
elements of experience may serve either to give man 
knowledge of existence 0r they may serve to aid him in 
escaping the inherent insecurity of existence towards 
that special per.fection that is the reward of an unbiased 
contemplation of essence. Thi·s, then, is the role that 
essences play in attaining knowledge of truth. 
The major weakness in Santayanals analysis of 
truth is the ambiguousness of what he actually means by 
. 
Truth. As has already been cited in subtopic H, 
Chapter IV, Truth is "the aspect the universe would wear 
to omniscience," If truth were this, what could it 
possibly mean? Formally speaking this definition is a 
1Ibid.' p. 584. 
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mere tautology, for Truth is contained in the very 
concept of omniscience. It is a meaningless statement. 
In Santayana•s conception of pragmatic truth, 
however, we have a conception of truth that is closer 
to the epistemological problem. Existence is problemati-
cal, hence, any knowledge of that existence must be 
problematical also. A pragmatic definition of truth is 
~ped to deal with the inherent insecurity of 
Santayana~s epistemology and is perhaps the only one so 
suited. 
Unfortunately The Realm of Essence is not parti-
cularly relevant to a consideration of the place of 
essence in Santayanafs epistemology. His utterances in 
this work are characteristically ontological and as such 
refer primarily to the subsistence of essences as possibles 
and not their symbolic function of revealing existence. 
For this reason The Realm of Essence has not been cited 
as there were more suitable references in Santayana's 
more characteristically epistemological works. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the 
place of essences in the epistemology of Santayana and by 
doing so to make some judgment as to the adequacy of his 
view. The place of essences is considered within the 
framework of certain established epistemological problems, 
viz., the o~igin and nature of knowledge, the structure of 
the knowing situation, and the possibility of knowledge. 
Finally the theory of essences is summarized and criticized 
but only after setting Santayana'within the perspective of 
critical realism_ 
As a critical realist Santayana believes that 
knowledge is mediated ~nd he iP therefore concerned with 
the nature of the mediating vehicle~ The problem of 
error presents a serfous obstacle to the assertion that the 
data of experience are consti~uent·elements of their 
objects. And yet not all of our experience is erroneously 
interpreted, hence the object must be considered as inde-
pendent of appearances and yet somehow appearance must be 
considered as relevant to its object. Essences, th~n, 
cannot be physical and as relevant neither can they be 
considered as subjective mental products, therefore they 
must be considered as neutral. 
• 
• 
• 
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~n Chapter II intuitions of essences are seen as 
occasioned by environmental stimulation and determined by 
the underlying structure of the organism. All power is 
material, hence all activity is restricted to either sub-
stance itself or its evolved physical co~nterpart--psyche~ 
In order to account for knowledge a spirit which records 
the activity of the psyche must be assumed. However, as 
epiphenomenal this spirit cannot affect the material 
psyche. Nature stimulates the p~yche which, in responding 
to that stimulation, .evokes an intuition of essence. This 
intuition of essence, when it is taken as a sign of some 
intended object, 9ecomes knowledge of the activity of the 
psyche and the plane of natural objects with which the 
psyche is involved~ 
In Chapter ~II the perceptual situation is analyzed 
in terms of the inter-relations of the vario~s elements. 
Matter acts, psyche reacts, and spirit records. Spirit 
records by fixing the data of intuition and adding, by 
means of animal fai~h, an adventitious order to these 
essences, Since existence is externally related and 
essence is internally related, essences, if they are to 
represent existence must be,adventitiously placed in 
external relations. ·To do this spirit must trust the animal 
faith of the psyche and take essences as meaning existence. 
Spirit, then$ is powerless to act, therefore the material 
0 
0 
0 
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psyche must act for it and turn neutral essences into 
meaning£ul signs and symbols for existence~ 
In Chapter IV it is shown th~t intuition is insuf-
ficient for knowledge1 it is essentially belief, and 
consequently fraught with the insecurity inherent in the 
li£e of the animal. Symbols must be imaginatruvely woven 
into a representation of existence which may or may not 
adequately express reality. Knowledge or true belief, then, 
I 
is essentially pragmatic, that is, beli~f is true if it 
aids the animal in dealing adequately with his environment~ 
Pragmatic truth is appropriate description and to be 
appropriate it must be public in the sense of being a 
standard and comprehensive description. Knowledge, then, 
is possible but qualified by the necessities of animal 
life and the fundamenta~ dualism of sign and object. 
In Chapter V the nature, function, ,and relation of 
essences to· spirit; thinking, and'truth are summarized and 
criticized. The first major weakness that is noted comes 
out of the discussion of why essences cannot be either 
physical or psychical. Granted essences cannot be con-
sidered physical, for how could we account for error, but 
why may not the data of intuition, Santayana•s essences, 
be considered mental or psychical? S~nce the intuiting 
of essences are admittedly psychical in status why may they 
not be considered psychical in fact? Intuitions of 
• 
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essences are evoked f~om the organs of sense and are the 
only undubitable data of the immaterial spirit. Hence it 
seems quite natural that they should be considered 
mental data, the produ~t of simple sensing. That 
Santayana does not consider them to be so and clings to the 
concept of non-existent essences seems to be a weakness in 
his epistemological theory. 
The second major weakness that is noted is that 
since essences, as ~deals, cannot give knowledge of 
existence but must be clothed with the garment of existence 
and turned into sense-eontents by animal faith, why not 
call intuitions of essences sense-contents? If essences 
must become sense-contents before they can give knowledge 
of existence then at least in the context of the knowing 
situation they must be sense-contents. Essences qua 
essences then, are only relevant to a spirit that simply 
stares, or contemplates them, in belief and knowledge they 
are sense-contents, signs for transcendent objects. For 
knowledge, at least, non-existent and neutral essences 
are superfluous. 
A third weakness in Santayana•s account is the 
impotency of the spirit as simply contemplative. He says 
spirit becomes knowledge of existence yet denies to spirit 
the power to aid the psyche in dealing with its environment, 
The fact is thatwwe do change our ways of thinking and 
0 
0 
acting on the basis of ~hat is learned in experience~ 
hence the claim that the spirit is impotent or merely 
contemplative is unacceptable and contrary to the most 
obvious facts of experience. The change of habit which 
comes after particularly illuminating ~nsights ma inade-
quate. The speed ~ith which we modify thought and 
activity can hardly be explained by the cumbersome and 
time-consuming process of changing our habits. 
122 
~inally~ Santayana~s concept of pragmatic truth 
is quite adequate and perhaps the only adequate concept 
of truth considering the complexity of his epistemologi-
cal scheme. Eis more ultim~te concept of truth as the 
aspect the universe would wear to omniscience, however, 
is quite amgibuous. In fact~ it is tautologous, for truth 
is implied in the very concept of omniscience. Also such 
a concept of truth is meaningless for it is impossible to 
conceive of such a truth as being known by anything other 
than an omniscient being. Santayana•s concept of ulti-
mate truth1 then~ is quite ambiguous and unlikely to be 
verified. 
